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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Propriety of a Duty to Correct Material Tax Return
Errors
A lingering oddity of the procedural rules governing federal taxa-
tion is the failure of those rules to unambiguously require a taxpayer
who discovers she has materially understated her federal tax liability
on her federal tax return to fie an amended return correcting the er-
rors, assuming the errors are discovered before expiration of the limi-
tations period for the taxable year to which the return relates.' The
propriety of a duty to file an amended return might seem to follow
from a federal tax system that imposes upon the taxpayer, not the
government, the burden of making a correct determination of tax
liability.2
Only two reasons seem to excuse the taxpayer's failure to correct
an error on an amended return if the taxpayer discovers the error
within the period of limitations. First, the error might be de minimis
(not material) so that its correction is not worth the taxpayer's time,
trouble, or expense. Second, the taxpayer's discovery of the error
might be so recent that the taxpayer has not yet had a reasonable
amount of time to discharge her obligation to correct the error.
If this analysis is correct, any duty to amend must be properly cir-
cumscribed. The duty should be limited to "material" errors, with ma-
1. The creation of a legal duty to file amended returns has been controversial. See
James A. Bruton, I, Correcting (Or Not Correcting) Erroneous Tax Returns, 47
INST. ON FED. TAX-N § 53.03, at 53-7 n.16 (1989)(stating that a legal duty is fa-
vored by the Committee on Standards of Practice of the American Bar Associa-
tion Tax Section, but disfavored by the Committee on Civil and Criminal
Penalties of the American Bar Association Tax Section). A legal duty was recom-
mended in a preliminary draft on civil penalties by the IRS. ExEcUTIvE TASK
FORCE, ColmissIoNE's PENALTY STuDy, INTERNAL REvENUE SERV., REPORT ON
CIVIL TAx PENALTmS (Working Draft, Chapters 1-4, 8)(1988), microformed on
Doc. 88-9517, ch. 8, at 33 (Tax Notes Microfiche Database)[hereinafter Working
Draft]. This recommendation was replaced in the final report by a recommenda-
tion that a comprehensive study be conducted. ExEcuTIvE TASK FORCE, COTSns-
sioNe's PENALTY STuDy, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REPORT ON CrVIL TAX
PENALTIES (1989), microformed on Doc. 89-1586, at VIH-45 to -46 [hereinafter
IRS Penalty Study]. See also Bruton, supra, § 53.03, at 53-7 n.17, 53-8 nn.18-19.
Commentators also have expressed divergent positions. A legal duty seemed
to be generally favored (largely on equitable grounds) by Kenneth L. Harris, On
Requiring the Correction of Error Under the Federal Tax Law, 42 TAx LAw. 515
(1989), but its wisdom questioned (largely because of practitioners' experience
that the "existing system works well" and that a formal rule "would simplify the
process to the point of rigidity") by Bruton, supra, § 53.10, at 53-45.
2. Although it is sometimes said that the taxpayer self-assesses her tax liability,
technically the taxpayer determines and reports the tax due. I.R.C. § 6001
(1996). The Internal Revenue Service assesses tax liability based on information
provided by the taxpayer and other information available to the IRS. I.R.C.
88 6201-6207 (1996).
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teriality defined to enable a taxpayer to determine whether or not an
error is material. Errors, the net effect of which entitle the taxpayer
to a refund of taxes paid, normally should not give rise to a legal obli-
gation to amend. The taxpayer's self-interest in not overpaying her
federal taxes should sufficiently assure that the taxpayer will file an
amended return whenever the refund involved justifies the taxpayer's
time, trouble, and expense of filing a corrected return.
Further, noncompliance with a duty to amend should not be penal-
izable until the expiration of a reasonable amount of time to comply
with the duty, an amount of time that must be statutorily defined. No
duty to amend can follow if discovery of the error occurs after expira-
tion of the limitations period for the taxable year to which the error
relates. A duty to amend is predicated upon the existence of an un-
paid tax. Once the statute of limitations expires, the unpaid tax is no
longer a debt owed to the government. The taxpayer's duty to report
additional tax must expire concomitantly with the government's abil-
ity to assess and collect it.
This Article examines the law's failure to require taxpayers to cor-
rect material understatements of their tax liabilities and the conse-
quences of this failure, and recommends enactment of a legal duty to
amend. This Article suggests a definition of the legal duty to amend
that assures that the duty is properly circumscribed.
A duty to amend might (or might not) be accompanied by a correla-
tive duty to investigate. If imposed, the duty to investigate would be
applicable when the taxpayer reasonably suspects that a material re-
porting error may have been committed and would be undertaken to
determine whether in fact an amended return is required. This Arti-
cle supports extending the duty to amend to incorporate a correlative
duty to investigate in appropriate circumstances and identifies cir-
cumstances that would give rise to the duty to investigate. It is recog-
nized, however, that a viable tax compliance system might include a
duty to correct known material understatements of tax liability with-
out requiring the taxpayer to investigate possible, but unconfirmed re-
porting errors.3
B. Penalty Structure and Statutes of Limitations
The enactment of a legal duty to amend raises a number of ques-
tions concerning the relationship between the duty to amend and ap-
plicable penalties or statutes of limitations. What effect should the
taxpayer's corrected amended return have on penalties otherwise ap-
plicable to the erroneous original return? What penalties should be
applicable if the taxpayer fails to comply with a duty to file an
amended return? What effect, if any, should filing an amended return
3. See infra section III.C.
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have on the statute of limitations for the taxable year at issue? What
effect, if any, should failure to file an amended return have on the
statute of limitations for the taxable year at issue?
There is a complete spectrum of possible answers to these ques-
tions. The approach favored in this Article proceeds from the observa-
tion that enactment of a legal duty to amend would subject the
taxpayer to a continuous, ongoing duty to correctly report tax liability.
The duty would begin with the due date of the original return and
would end with the expiration of the period of limitations for the as-
sessment of tax for the taxable year.
This Article argues that, if a legal duty to amend is enacted, a tax-
payer culpably committing or perpetuating a reporting error generally
should face the same exposure to penalty whether the culpable behav-
ior occurs at the time of filing of the original return or at some later
date within the limitations period. Similarly, a taxpayer voluntarily
correcting a reporting error generally (but not always) should enjoy
the same mitigated (or eliminated) exposure to penalty whether the
error is caught and corrected before the original return is filed or at
some later date within the limitations period.
Under current law, the limitations period within which the Inter-
nal Revenue Service may assess additional tax generally depends on
the magnitude and culpability of the taxpayer's reporting errors. This
Article argues that if a legal duty to amend is enacted, a taxpayer
culpably committing or perpetuating a reporting error generally
should face the same duration of exposure to an IRS audit whether the
culpable behavior occurs at the time of filing of the original return or
at some later date within the limitations period. Similarly, a taxpayer
correcting a reporting error generally (but not always) should enjoy
the same reduced duration of exposure to an IRS audit whether the
error is caught and corrected before the original return is filed or at
some later date within the limitations period.
It is important to realize that although adoption of a legal duty to
correct tax return errors raises questions about the penalty structure
and applicable statutes of limitations that will best accommodate the
duty, any debate about these questions is not a debate about the pro-
priety of adoption of a legal duty to amend. Instead, penalty issues
and limitations period issues are subsidiary issues to be resolved once
it is determined that adoption of a legal duty to amend is appropriate.
This is so even though tax compliance clearly is impacted not only by
adoption of a duty to amend, but also by the choices of appropriate
penalties and accompanying limitations periods.
C. Article Organization
Part H of this Article examines the law's failure to require correc-
tion of material tax return errors, the consequences of this failure, and
19971
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the merits of an amended return obligation. The conclusion endorses
the promulgation of a rule requiring taxpayers to correct material re-
porting errors by amending erroneous tax returns. Part III examines
the definitional problems engendered by such a rule and suggests a
resolution of these problems. Part IV recommends a penalty structure
applicable to both original return errors corrected by timely amended
returns and breaches of the duty to amend. Part V recommends a
statutes of limitations structure that is applicable to both original re-
turn errors corrected by amended returns and breaches of the duty to
amend. Part VI summarizes the major conclusions and
recommendations.
II. MERITS OF AN AMENDED RETURN OBLIGATION
A. Current Lack of a Duty to Correct Tax Return Errors
The procedural provisions of the Internal Revenue Code4 (the
Code) require taxpayers with sufficient income to file a return,5 im-
pose filing deadlines on taxpayers,6 and specify penalties for failure to
file correctly or failure to pay taxes.7 These provisions, however, gen-
erally do not refer to amended returns.8 Instead, the Code generally
contemplates only the filing of a single return.9 The failure of the stat-
utory framework to incorporate a role for amended returns was recog-
nized in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner,10 subsequently
cited in Badaracco v. Commissioner." Badaracco held that an
amended return did not commence the running of the statute of limi-
tations when the original return was fraudulent. The Court acknowl-
edged the statutory nonrecognition accorded an amended return:
[Ihe Internal Revenue Code does not explicitly provide either for a taxpayer's
filing, or for the Commissioner's acceptance, of an amended return; instead,
an amended return is a creature of administrative origin and grace. Thus,
when Congress provided for assessment at any time in the case of a false or
fraudulent "return," it plainly included by this language a false or fraudulent
original return.1 2
4. Unless otherwise specified, all references to sections of the Internal Revenue
Code are to the provisions of the Code as amended through November 4, 1997.
5. I.R.C. § 6012.
6. Id. §§ 6071-6081.
7. Id. §§ 6651-6724.
8. 4 BoRis I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATEs
AND GiFTs 111.1.7, at 111-12 n.54 (2d ed. 1992).
9. I.R.C. § 6213(g) (including amended returns as "returns" for tax assessment pur-
poses). This section is the Code's only reference to amended returns, although
the term appears in the caption to I.R.C. § 6501(c)(7) (extending by 60 days the
limitations period for the assessment of tax shown on a return filed within 60
days of the date the limitations period would otherwise expire).
10. 460 U.S. 370, 378-80 n.10 (1983).
11. 464 U.S. 386, 393 (1984).
12. Id.
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Treasury regulations permit the filing of amended returns for pur-
poses of correcting errors and making or changing various tax elec-
tions.J3 The regulations do not, however, impose a duty on taxpayers
to file amended returns.' 4 Treasury regulations provide that if a tax-
payer "ascertains" that income was improperly omitted from a prior
year's return, the taxpayer "should, if within the period of limitation,"
file a corrected amended return and pay any additional tax due.' 5 If
the taxpayer "ascertains" that an item was improperly included in in-
come on a prior year's return, the taxpayer "should, if within the pe-
riod of limitation," file a claim for credit or refund of any resulting tax
overpayment.' 6 Similarly, Treasury regulations provide that if a tax-
payer "ascertains" that a liability was improperly omitted from a prior
year's return, the taxpayer "should, if within the period of limitation,"
file a claim for credit or refund of any resulting tax overpayment.17 If
the taxpayer "ascertains" that a liability was improperly claimed on a
prior year's return, the taxpayer "should, if within the period of limita-
tion," file a corrected amended return and pay any additional tax
due.' 8 Thus, the Treasury regulations encourage, but do not require,
the correction of tax return errors.1 9
Because a taxpayer has no duty to correct material reporting er-
rors, a taxpayer's exposure to penalties generally is not worsened by
13. For an analysis of the varying uses of amended returns predating the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Badaracco, see Susan L. Brennan, The Uncer-
tain Status of Amended Tax Returns: Their Varying Impact on Tax Deficiencies,
Tax Elections, and the Statute of Limitations on Civil Tax Fraud, 7 REv. TAXZN
TNDrVmmuALs 235 (1983).
14. The Secretary of the Treasury is granted the authority to require taxpayers to file
returns. I.R.C. § 6011(a). It is unclear, in light of Badaracco, whether the Secre-
tary has general authority to require filing of amended returns to correct original
return errors. See BERNARD WOIFIAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRAcrIcE
§ 207.4.1, at 104 (1997)(stating that the Secretary "may arguably" possess such
authority); Harris, supra note 1, at 516 (expressing similar uncertainty). Clearly,
however, modifying statutory penalties and limitations periods to apply to the
original return, as amended, in the manner suggested in this Article would re-
quire congressional action.
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (as amended in 1993)(emphasis added).
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(3) (as amended in 1994)(emphasis added).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. William L. Raby, Amended Returns--Still an Undefined Solution, 60 TAX NOTES
1617, 1618 (1993)("[Als a rule of behavior, the word 'should' seems more aspira-
tional than mandatory."); Joseph E. Ronan, Jr., Do Clients Have a Duty to File
Amended Tax Returns?, 33 PRAc. LAw. 25, 26-27 (1987)("The use of 'should'
rather than 'must' in those regulations would appear to indicate a precatory, and
not a mandatory, provision, and can therefore be construed as imposing a form of
'moral duty' which can be disregarded by a taxpayer without legal
consequences.").
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her failure to correct reporting errors.2 0 For example, in Broadhead v.
Commissioner,21 an accountant responsible for preparation of the
original return informed the taxpayer of an original return reporting
error 22 that led to a significant understatement of taxable income. 23
The accountant prepared an amended return and instructed the tax-
payer to file it. The taxpayer refused to do so. The Tax Court rejected
the IRS's imposition of a civil fraud penalty, holding that no duty ex-
isted to file an amended return and, if the taxpayer had submitted an
amended return, the IRS could have rejected it.24 The court found
that the fraud penalty was appropriate only if the IRS could establish
that the taxpayer acted with fraudulent intent when the original re-
turn was filed. Other cases have reached similar results. 2 5 Thus,
whether tax return errors are innocent errors not subject to penalty,
negligent errors subjecting the taxpayer to a negligence penalty, or
fraudulent errors subjecting the taxpayer to penalties for fraud de-
pends on the taxpayer's knowledge and behavior that led to the com-
mission of the errors. The taxpayer's postfiling knowledge and
behavior are irrelevant to the imposition of penalties except to the ex-
tent that proof of such knowledge or behavior sheds light on what the
taxpayer must have known or done (or failed to do) when committing
the errors.
Further, if the return error results in underpayment of tax, the
taxpayer's refusal to amend the return and pay additional tax, with-
out more, does not appear to be criminal tax evasion. 26 Nor does the
20. See John McGown, Jr., Individuals Escape Penalties for Failure to Amend Incor-
rect Federal Income Tax Returns, 24 bDAHo L. REv. 235, 244-46 (1988)(citing
Hauser v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 908 (1970); Broadhead v. Commis-
sioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 1284 (1955)(holding that tax fraud must be established
on the basis of conduct as of the time of filing the tax return, not on the basis of
postfiling conduct), aff'd, 254 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1958); Semple v. Commissioner,
10 T.C.M. (CCH) 795 (1951)). McGown incorrectly states that Broadhead was
reversed on other grounds by the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 245 n.51. But see Estate of
Maceo v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 258 (1964), discussed by McGown, in
which the taxpayer's filing of amended returns after the taxpayer was alerted to
criminal investigation inquiries by a state agency was found to be "strong evi-
dence of fraudulent intent on the original returns." McGown, supra, at 246 (em-
phasis added).
21. 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 1284 (1955), affd, 254 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1958).
22. The error was the fault of an assistant to the accountant and the taxpayer was
in no way responsible" for the error. Id. at 1287.
23. Id. (finding that taxable income was understated by $54,872.81 because of the
error).
24. Id. at 1289.
25. See cases cited supra note 20.
26. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 498-500 (1943)(Tax evasion, a violation of
I.R.C. § 7201, requires a willful "commission" to satisfy the statutory require-
ment that there be an "attempt." A willful "omission" of failing to file a required
tax return and failing to pay taxes, without more, does not violate the statute.).
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refusal constitute a willful failure to pay tax27 because, without a duty
to correct the filed report, there apparently is no failure to pay (willful
or otherwise) until the government detects the error and demands
payment. 28
Thus, the authors of a recent treatise note that case law supports
the conclusion that the Code does not require the filing of amended
returns. 29 Nevertheless, taxpayers often have substantial incentive to
correct material reporting errors even though not legally compelled to
do so. Presumably, many taxpayers will want to file amended returns
simply to do the right thing.3 0 Others may fear that a refusal to cor-
rect will be viewed as evidence that the original errors were knowingly
and intentionally committed. Still others may wish to capitalize on
current regulatory provisions that mitigate or eliminate the tax-
payer's exposure to penalties if errors are corrected before commence-
ment of an IRS audit.3 1
B. Justifications for Requiring Taxpayer Correction of
Material Errors
The failure of tax procedural rules to explicitly require the correc-
tion of material errors leaves open an opportunity for tax avoidance
that appears to be unnecessary, unfair, and not consonant with the
duty imposed on taxpayers to initially determine and report their cor-
rect tax liabilities. When the opportunistic taxpayer asks her tax ad-
viser whether she has a legal obligation to file an amended return, the
adviser must answer, "No."32
27. The willful failure to pay tax is a crime under I.R.C. § 7203.
28. See WoiAN Err AL., supra note 14, § 207.4.1, at 105 n.55.
29. Id. § 207.4.1, at 105.
30. But see Ronan, supra note 19, at 26 (stating that taxpayers "tend to resist" filing
amended returns for the following reasons: the added cost and bother of doing so;
reluctance to pay additional tax, interest, and possibly penalties; fear that an
amended return will increase the chance of being audited; and concern that, if the
amount underpaid is significant, an amended return might be treated as an ad-
mission of wrongdoing that will trigger a criminal investigation).
31. See infra subsections IV.C.1 and IV.C.2 (explaining taxpayers' decreased expo-
sure to penalties for filing amended returns under current law in the context of a
penalty structure recommended to accompany adoption of a legal duty to amend).
See also WoirmN ET AL., supra note 14, § 207.4.1.1, at 106-07 (explaining the
benefits to taxpayers from correcting tax return errors).
32. Professional codes of conduct require lawyers, accountants, and other tax return
preparers to inform a client of an error on the tax return. WoLAN Er AL., supra
note 14, § 207.4.2, at 107-08. The client normally is to be advised to correct the
error, with the possible exception of an error exposing the client to criminal liabil-
ity. Id. (comparing ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965)
(providing that a lawyer must advise the client to correct the error), with Am~mP-
CAN INST. OF CERTMED PuB. AcCT., STATEMENT ON REsPoNsmmrrms IN TAX PRAC-
TICE No. 6, § .03 (Aug. 1988)(providing that a CPA should recommend to the
client appropriate action to be taken), and Treasury Circular 230, 31 C.F.R.
19971
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This gap in the tax compliance rules is unnecessary because no un-
due complications stem from a statutorily imposed duty to file
amended returns to correct material errors. The gap is unfair because
it differentiates the tax reporting obligations of taxpayers with equal
tax liabilities: taxpayers who either do not make errors or detect their
errors before the return filing date, and taxpayers who detect their
errors after the return filing date but within the period of limitations.
Nor is the gap consonant with the concept of self-reporting, which
forms the foundation of our tax compliance system. Self-reporting is
rooted in the theory that taxpayers possess the information needed to
accurately determine .their tax liabilities and that the government
neither possesses this information nor has the resources to acquire it
for the masses of taxpayers. Indeed, placing upon the government the
obligation to detect errors of which taxpayers already are aware seems
to invite greater governmental intrusion into the private affairs of tax-
payers than is necessary.3 3 Altogether, little or no justification exists
for waiving the taxpayer's obligation to report a significant tax that
the taxpayer knows to be a debt owed to the government.3 4
It seems safe to assume that taxpayers, although not required to do
so, generally will take the time and trouble to correct material errors
that were made in favor of the government when the correction enti-
tles taxpayers to substantial refunds. The failure to require a tax-
payer to correct material errors made in her own favor invites the
taxpayer's participation in the "audit lottery."3 5 This audit lottery
may give the taxpayer a ninety-eight percent chance or better of not
§ 10.21 (1988)(stating only that a practitioner before the IRS must inform the
client of the error)).
33. See Harris, supra note 1, at 529 ("The cost of shifting the discovery function to the
government, in terms of intrusion into citizens' privacy, may... be substantial.").
34. The primary reason that an amended return proposal has been resisted by some
professional groups is the concern that required amended returns might violate
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. See generally
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 2.07.4.4, at 113-14 (citing resistance by the
ABA Tax Section Committee on Civil and Criminal Penalties). Fifth Amendment
concerns are discussed infra section I.0.
35. See MICHAEL J. GA ETz & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL NcoME TAXATION PRIN-
CIPLES AND POLICIES 78-79 (3d ed. 1995)(An audit lottery participation is de-
scribed as an "opening bid" philosophy adopted by "[miany corporations and
individuals" in which "every issue [is resolved] in favor of paying less, on the
assumption that they will not be audited or that, if they are audited, the revenue
agent will overlook or compromise certain issues. At worst, they will pay the
taxes due plus interest."). See also WOLFMAN Er AL., supra note 14, § 201.2, at 45-
47 (describing the audit lottery as an outgrowth of the questionable philosophy
that a tax return is a submission in an adversarial proceeding); Judson L. Tem-
ple, The Tax Return and the Standard of Accuracy-Part I, 15 REv. TAX'N INDI-
vIDUALS 315, 324-25 (1991)(describing the audit lottery and the congressional
response to it, which was in the form of a "substantial understatement" penalty
under I.R.C. § 6661 (repealed 1989), and replaced in modified form by I.R.C.
§ 6662(b)(2)).
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being audited,36 therefore enabling the taxpayer to avoid forever pay-
ment of a tax known to be owing.
Unfortunately, the economic effects of enacting a legal duty to cor-
rect material tax return errors are unclear. The "gap" in the tax-
payer's self-reporting obligations iterated above is not necessarily
responsible for any meaningful portion of the "tax gap'-the gap be-
tween the federal income taxes owed and the federal income taxes ac-
tually collected. The tax gap is estimated at nearly one hundred
billion dollars annually3 7 and reflects both deliberate and inadvertent
reporting errors. The contribution of the "gap" in taxpayers' reporting
obligations to the "tax gap" depends upon the extent to which, if at all,
the absence of a legal duty to correct material reporting errors results
in more uncorrected errors and less tax revenue than otherwise would
occur. The extent to which enactment of a legal duty to amend would
alter taxpayers' reporting behavior cannot be predicted.
In the absence of empirical evidence, the effects of an amended re-
turn obligation on tax compliance must be gauged on the basis of more
abstract reasoning.38 It would seem, however, that taxpayers who are
willing to defraud the government on their original returns would
have little incentive to file corrected amended returns. Thus, an
amended return obligation would be more likely to alter the behavior
of taxpayers committing unintentional errors who (1) discover their
errors within the period of limitations, (2) would not have bothered to
correct the errors under current law, but (3) would bother if ac-
quainted with a legal duty to correct.
This group may not be large. Assume that it is not large or that a
legal duty to amend would not materially affect tax revenues in the
aggregate. In this situation, the imposition of a legal duty still seems
appropriate if, as is likely to be the case, the nuisance costs to the
36. MS Auditing More Poor People, Fewer Rich People, GAO Says, 71 TAx NOTES
1212 (1996)(citing a General Accounting Office report of an audit rate of 1.67% for
1995).
37. George Guttman, IRS Updates Estimates on Individual Tax Gap, 71 TAX NoTEs
857 (1996)(stating that for 1992, the last year for which estimates were available,
the IRS estimated the income tax gap at between $93.2 billion and $95.3 billion, a
range that excluded tax owed for illegal income (citing IRS Publication 1415, In-
dividual Income Tax Gap Estimates for 1985, 1988, and 1992 (Apr. 96))).
38. See Harris, supra note 1, at 532-34 (an amended return obligation holds up well
when measured against five criteria used to analyze legislation designed to im-
prove tax compliance: (1) increasing equity; (2) maximizing revenue; (3) minimiz-
ing the tax compliance burden on taxpayers and third parties; (4) increasing
administrative efficiency; and (5) minimizing intrusion into the taxpayer's pri-
vacy). Harris suggested improvements to an obligatory amended return proposal
drafted by Frederic G. Corneel for consideration by the ABA Section of Taxation.
Frederic G. Corneel, ABA Section of Taxation, Statutory Amended Return Propo-
sal (1985)[hereinafter Corneel Proposal], reprinted in Harris, supra note 1, app.
at 559-75.
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relatively small group of taxpayers whose tax compliance improves as
the result of enactment of the legal duty are justified by both the addi-
tional revenue collected by the government from these taxpayers and
the reduction in costs incurred by the IRS to audit these taxpayers.
To summarize, equitable considerations strongly countenance ex-
tension of the self-reporting duty to include a duty to correct material
errors discovered within the period of limitations. This extension
seems appropriate even if adoption of the duty results in insignificant
aggregate revenue increases. The self-reporting obligation should not
be an obligation that ends upon a tax return's due date. Instead, it
should be an obligation that begins on the return's due date (although
the taxpayer may discharge the obligation sooner by filing an early
return) and ends at the expiration of the limitations period for the as-
sessment of tax for the taxable year.
C. Constitutional Barriers to an Amended Return
Obligation
The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination has
been touted as a barrier to the imposition of a legal duty to require
corrected amended returns of individual taxpayerss 9 who have crimi-
nally falsified information on original returns.4 0 Analysis of relevant
case law, however, leads to the opposite conclusion. Generally, the
Fifth Amendment privilege must be claimed on the return itself and
does not provide legal justification for failure to file a return.4 1 Fur-
ther, laws requiring disclosure of potentially incriminating informa-
tion have been declared unconstitutional only when the statutes
themselves target a class of individuals "inherently suspect of crimi-
nal activities."4 2 A legal duty imposed on all taxpayers to correct ma-
terial errors, whether those errors reflect deliberate noncompliance or
39. The privilege against self-incrimination extends to individuals, but not corpora-
tions or other collective entities. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
40. Bruton, supra note 1, § 53.06, at 53-21 n.73.
41. Harris, supra note 1, at 544 (citing United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259
(1927)). The Fifth Amendment privilege may be claimed on the return instead of
reporting the source of the income if the income is derived from an illegal activity.
It is unclear, however, whether the taxpayer may in some circumstances be ex-
cused from reporting the amount of the income. Id. at 544 n.120 (contrasting
United States v. Booher, 641 F.2d 218, 220 (5th Cir. 1981)(requiring disclosure of
the amount of the income), with United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385, 394 (7th
Cir. 1977)(Tone, J., concurring)(stating that the amount of income could be sup-
pressed if it might be an incriminating factor)).
42. Harris, supra note 1, at 545 (citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Albertson v. Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965)).
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unintentional mistakes, would not target a suspect class and would
appear to withstand constitutional challenge.43
III. DEFINITION OF A PROPOSED AMENDED
RETURN OBLIGATION
If the tax compliance structure is to include a legal obligation to
correct material errors discovered within the limitations period, the
legal obligation requires definition. It is necessary to define what con-
stitutes an "error" that is subject to the obligation. Further, the defi-
nition of error must explain when the error is "material." It is also
necessary to define when a taxpayer is to be charged with either
"knowledge" of the error or the possibility of error that is sufficient to
give rise to a duty to amend or a duty to investigate further.
43. As discussed infra subsections IV.C.1 and IV.C.2, it may be advisable to excuse
penalties attributable to nonfraudulent return errors, while not excusing either
civil or criminal penalties attributable to fraudulent errors when the taxpayer
complies with a duty to file a timely amended return correcting these errors. This
approach would discriminate against taxpayers who commit criminal (or civil)
tax fraud on the original return by penalizing them more severely than taxpayers
who commit nonfraudulent errors.
This discriminatory effect would have no constitutional implications. Crimi-
nal conduct typically is penalized more severely than conduct that (perhaps
through an absence of the requisite mens rea) either is not criminal or is criminal
conduct of a lesser degree. Thus, the discriminatory effect of more severe crimi-
nal sanctions does not breach citizens' constitutional rights.
The Fifth Amendment issue, across a broad spectrum of self-reporting stat-
utes, is whether the self-reporting statutes serve a prosecutorial purpose by
targeting a class of persons whose behavior is inherently criminally suspect.
Harris, in a detailed analysis of the federal courts' interpretations of these stat-
utes, concluded that a legal duty to file an amended return correcting material
original return errors would not violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination. Harris, supra note 1, at 545-49. In support of his conclusion,
Professor Harris noted the following: (1) the duty to file an amended return
would apply to taxpayers committing noncriminal original return errors as well
as to taxpayers committing criminal errors; (2) the amended return obligation
would have as its principal purpose the proper payment of federal taxes, not a
prosecutorial purpose; (3) the amended return requirement would not establish
any necessary linkage to prior criminal activity; and (4) the duty to amend would
not create a different quandary for the taxpayer who criminally falsifies the orig-
inal return than the quandary faced by a taxpayer who is required to report ille-
gally-obtained income on the original return-the latter duty does not violate the
Fifth Amendments privilege against self-incrimination. Id. Each of these fac-
tors distinguishes a duty to correct material tax return errors from self-disclosure
obligations that have been held to violate the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Thus, the contrary conclusion reached by Professor Bruton, supra note 1,
§ 53.06, at 53-21, seems wrong. Bruton concluded that "[a]lthough no court has
decided the precise issue, it seems clear that taxpayers who have previously filed
incorrect returns form a 'suspect class' who cannot be compelled to incriminate
themselves by filing amended returns." Id.
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A. Definition of 'Error"
An error obviously must include any mathematical miscalculation
and any reported position that is clearly wrong. The tax treatment of
an item on the return-such as its exclusion from income, its deduc-
tion from income, or its credit against tax liability-presents a more
difficult question: Should such tax treatment be described as an "er-
ror" if the position taken with respect to the item is probably wrong,
but might be sustained if litigated?
1. Return Positions Less Likely than Not to Prevail
Whether the reporting position taken with respect to the item is an
"error" should depend on whether or not the taxpayer is entitled to
take that position on the original return. Section 6662, the Code's
"accuracy-related penalty,"4 4 sets forth the circumstances under
which the taxpayer is entitled to claim a tax return position that is
less likely than not to prevail if the matter is litigated.45 If the tax-
payer's reported position with respect to the item did not expose the
taxpayer to either a possible § 6662 accuracy-related penalty or a
§ 6663 civil fraud penalty,46 then the position taken would not be de-
fined as an "error" even if the item ultimately was determined to be
incorrectly reported. If the treatment of the item on the tax return
exposed the taxpayer to either a possible § 6662 accuracy-related pen-
alty or a § 6663 fraud penalty, then the position taken would be within
the definition of an "error."4 7
44. This language appears in the caption of I.R.C. § 6662.
45. Professor Johnson favors a reporting standard permitting only tax return posi-
tions that are "as-likely-as-not" to prevail, not positions "less-likely-than-not" to
prevail. Calvin Johnson, 'True and Correct. Standards for Tax Return Report-
ing, 43 TAx NoTEs 1521 (1989). See also Temple, supra note 35, at 316 ("The
position advocated here is that taxpayers should be required to report uncertain
items in the manner that is most probably correct.").
46. For a definition of civil fraud see infra note 73.
47. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [hereinafter AICPA] de-
fines an error, for purposes of delineating responsibilities of the CPA, to include
both (1) any undisclosed position taken on the return that the CPA does not have
a "good faith belief that the position has a realistic possibility of being sustained
administratively or judicially on its merits if challenged," and (2) any "frivolous"
position, even if disclosed. AMERICAN INsT. OF CERTIFIED PUB. AccT., STATEMENT
ON REsPONSIBILITIES IN TAX PRACTICE No. 2, § 112.02 (Aug. 1988)(revised May
1991), and AMERICAN INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. AcT., STATEMENT ON RESPONSIBIL-
rIEs IN TAX PRACTICE No. 6, § 162.01 (Aug. 1988)(revised May 1991)[hereinafter
AICPA STATEMENTs], reprinted in WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 14, app. at 482-83,
496. This definition is tailored to I.R.C. § 6694, which penalizes return preparers
for undisclosed positions for which there is no realistic possibility of success and
for frivolous positions, whether or not disclosed, if the preparer knew or reason-
ably should have known of the positions.
The standards of I.R.C. §§ 6662 and 6663 (governing taxpayers) are phrased
in language different than I.R.C. § 6694 (governing return preparers). While the
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As so defined, an error would include any "frivolous" position, that
is, any position that was "patently improper," since such positions al-
ways subject the taxpayer to a § 6662 penalty.48 Indeed, any return
position for which the taxpayer lacked a "reasonable basis" would be a
negligent position and would subject the taxpayer to the § 6662(b)(1)
negligence penalty.4 9 This would constitute an error. If a position,
other than a tax shelter position, was supported by "substantial au-
thority,"5o then it would not be an error since the position would not
be penalizable under § 6662, even if the taxpayer's position was re-
jected in litigation.5 '
Similarly, a nonnegligent position, other than a tax shelter posi-
tion, would not be an "error" if "adequately disclosed" to the IRS52
since a position so disclosed would not be subject to the § 6662 pen-
alty. This would be true even if ultimately the position was deter-
mined to be incorrect. Generally, a position is "adequately disclosed"
if it is reported to the IRS in a manner authorized by Treasury regula-
tions and is calculated to direct the IRS's attention both to the item
discrepancy may be unfortunate, it makes sense to define an "error" that the tax-
payer is obligated to correct in terms of the reporting standards of I.R.C. §§ 6662
and 6663, which define the standards to which taxpayers are held under the
Code, rather than the standards applicable to return preparers under I.R.C.
§ 6694.
48. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(2) (1991)(applicable to return preparers, but incor-
porated by reference in the "reasonable basis" standard applicable to taxpayers).
See also infra note 49.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) (1995). Further, the "reasonable basis" standard re-
quired to avoid negligence is "significantly higher than the not frivolous standard
applicable to preparers under section 6694 and defined in § 1.6994-2(c)(2)." Id.
§ 1.6662-3(b)(3). See generally WoLiFiA FT AL., supra note 14, § 202.3.1.1.
50. This concept is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (1995). "Authorities" include,
inter alia, tax treatises, statutes, congressional committee reports, case decisions,
and the more significant administrative promulgations, which include private let-
ter rulings issued after October 31, 1976, even though such rulings are binding
only for the taxpayers who are parties to the rulings. Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii)
(1995). Notably excluded from the list of authorities are both conclusions reached
in treatises or legal periodicals and in legal opinions, including in opinions ren-
dered by tax professionals. Whether authorities are "substantial" may depend on
a variety of factors, including the age of the authorities, the identity of the issu-
ers, whether or not they are well-reasoned or merely conclusory, and the array of
supporting or opposing authorities. Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i), (ii).
51. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i).
52. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)(W. If nonnegligent, the disclosed item will have a
§ 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I) "reasonable basis" of support. See supra note 49 and accom-
panying text. A corporation, however, is statutorily denied a "reasonable basis"
for, and so is negligent with respect to, a tax treatment of an item attributable to
a "multiple-party financing transaction" that does not "clearly reflect" corporate
income. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) (1995).
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and to the uncertainties regarding the correctness of the position
taken with respect to the item.5 3
A "tax shelter," for reporting purposes, includes any arrangement
or investment a significant purpose of which is tax avoidance or tax
evasion.5 4 A tax shelter position of a noncorporate taxpayer is not
subject to penalty if substantial authority supports the position and
the taxpayer reasonably believes the position is more likely than not
correct.55 Thus, a tax shelter position satisfting these dual require-
ments would not be a reporting "error." On the other hand, a tax shel-
ter position failing either the "substantial authority" test or the "more
likely than not correct" condition would be an error. If the error is
material, a taxpayer acquiring knowledge of the error would have a
duty to correct it by means of an amended return.
The § 6662 accuracy penalty is excused if the taxpayer demon-
strates both "reasonable cause" for the error and that the taxpayer
had acted in good faith.56 "Reasonable cause" for making the error
frequently would not constitute "reasonable cause" for perpetuating
the error through failure to file an amended return. Thus, an "error"
obligating the taxpayer to file an amended return would include many
original return positions for which the § 6662 accuracy penalty is ex-
cused by the application of the "reasonable cause" exception.
2. Retroactive Changes in the Law
A tax return that is correct when filed might become erroneous
through a change in the law that has retroactive application. This
arguably would give rise to a duty to amend. Suppose, for example,
the taxpayer filed a return adopting a position supported by a decision
of a federal circuit court of appeals. Subsequently, the United States
Supreme Court reversed this decision, rendering the taxpayer's posi-
tion erroneous. Suppose, in the alternative, that Congress enacted
tax legislation with retroactive effect that rendered incorrect a posi-
tion claimed on the tax return. In either case, the taxpayer's return,
although correct when filed, would become erroneous.
If the taxpayer is viewed as having a continuous duty to correctly
report her tax liability, then errors created by retroactive changes in
the law should be treated as errors giving rise to the duty to amend.5 7
53. The mechanics of making "adequate disclosure" are set forth in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6662-4(f) (1995).
54. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii).
55. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i), (C)(i)(I). If the taxpayer is a corporation, this exception is
inapplicable. Nevertheless, the corporation may still rely on the "reasonable
cause" exception of I.R.C. § 6664(c).
56. Id. § 6664(c)(1).
57. The AICPA's definition of an error includes positions that become errors because
of retroactive changes in the law. AICPA STATEMENTS, supra note 47.
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Therefore, such errors, if material and if discovered within the period
of limitations, should obligate the taxpayer to file an amended return
to correct the errors.58
B. "Materiality" Defined
1. Basic Definition
It seems apparent that a duty to correct tax return errors must be
limited to material errors. Having to reexamine tax returns or finan-
cial records is at best a nuisance for the taxpayer and may be costly in
terms of money or time. The taxpayer should be burdened with this
obligation only when the error or possibility of error is sufficiently se-
rious to warrant such trouble.
A practical definition of materiality seems to require measurement
by both absolute and relative floors. For example, an error might be
deemed material when the error causes a "substantial understate-
ment" of tax within the meaning of § 6662(b).59 As so defined, an er-
ror would be material if it resulted in an understatement of tax equal
to the larger of(1) $5,000 ($10,000 for corporations other than S corpo-
rations or personal holding companies), 60 or (2) ten percent of the tax
required to be shown on the return for the taxable year. 61
In the absence of the absolute floor ($5,000 or $10,000), a taxpayer
with two dollars of reported tax liability would be required to amend
to correct an error that caused a one dollar underpayment of tax. In
the absence of the relative floor (ten percent), a corporate taxpayer
with $100,000,000 of taxable income and a $35,000,000 tax liability
would be required to amend to correct an underpayment of tax of
$10,000. In either case, the nuisance costs of correcting the error
would outweigh the importance of a fully accurate report of the tax-
payer's income.
58. "[I]t would seem to follow that a taxpayer should have an obligation to correct a
prior position which is subsequently invalidated by retroactive law (assuming
that the retroactive law requires amendment of the prior position)-even though
the prior position was not in error at the time of filing." Harris, supra note 1, at
538. But see Working Draft, supra note 1, at 33 ("A taxpayer should be required
to file an amended return when the taxpayer becomes aware that a previously
fied return was materially incorrect at the time it was filed." (emphasis added)).
59. The Corneel Proposal, supra note 38, proposed limiting the amended return obli-
gation to "material" errors. Materiality was measured by the "substantial under-
statement" provision of the Code as then embodied in I.R.C. § 6661. Section 6661
was replaced in 1990 by I.R.C. § 6662. See Harris, supra note 1, at 534-35. This
Article endorses the same approach as was taken in Harris' article, using the
"substantial understatement" standards now incorporated in I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2),
(d). By contrast, AICPA's definition of an error excludes any item having an "in-
significant effect" on the client's liability. AICPA STATEIEENTS, supra note 47.
60. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A)(ii), (B).
61. Id. § 6662(d)(1)(A)(i).
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2. "Materiality" of Multiple Errors
If the taxpayer makes multiple errors (some of which may be off-
setting), materiality probably should be measured by the net effect of
the errors on tax liability. Multiple errors are likely to be more of a
nuisance to correct than single errors. Therefore, if a tax deficiency
caused by a single error is not material, the case for requiring amend-
ment of a return can be no stronger when the same tax deficiency
arises from the net effect of multiple errors. 62 Although it could be
argued that multiple errors require more time or expense to fix and
therefore deserve a higher threshold of materiality, there is no pre-
dictable correlation between the number of errors and the time or ex-
pense that must be expended to correct them. Calibrating the
materiality threshold to the number of errors to be corrected unduly
complicates matters and assumes a nonexistent quantifiable relation-
ship between the number of errors and the time or expense required to
correct them. It is preferable to utilize a single threshold of material-
ity. The duty to amend would arise if the net effect of the taxpayer's
errors was an understatement of tax liability that exceeded this
threshold.
3. "Materiality" of Errors with No Impact on Tax Liability
Another difficulty relates to errors on the tax return that have no
impact on tax liability. Consider whether the taxpayer errors in the
following situations should be deemed material. Schedule B (Form
1040) 1996, Line 12 poses the question: "During 1996, did you receive
a distribution from, or were you the grantor of, or transferor to, a for-
eign trust?" Suppose the answer is "yes," but the taxpayer incorrectly
marked the "no" box. Or suppose, instead, the taxpayer failed to an-
swer the question when filing Schedule B. Suppose again that a tax-
payer incorrectly listed $5,000 of deductible interest as deductible
charitable gifts under circumstances causing no net change in tax
liability.
As a general proposition, errors that have no impact on tax liability
probably should not be considered "material" since the determination
and collection of the proper tax is the only purpose of requiring tax
returns. "Check the box" questions on tax return forms, however, seek
information that is particularly important to the IRS in properly dis-
charging its functions.6 3 Thus, incorrect answers to "check the box"
questions might be deemed to be material errors.
62. See Harris, supra note 1, at 538-39 (stating that the net effect of multiple errors
should determine materiality).
63. "[The] failure to accurately report the existence of a foreign bank account or trust
on Schedule B of an individual income tax return may be material [for tax fraud
purposes] even if accurate amounts of income have been reported on the return."
Bruton, supra note 1, § 53.02, at 53-5 (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
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If this approach is adopted, then the incorrect information (and
possibly the failure to provide information) concerning foreign trusts
would be deemed "material" errors, whereas the misidentification of
interest payments as charitable gifts would not be material. It is pos-
sible, of course, that an error with no immediate effect on tax liability
(and so not material) would subsequently impact tax liability. This
might occur, for example, because of the impact of a loss carryback or
carryover provision of the Code,64 and so the error might subsequently
become material.
C. Taxpayer's "Knowledge" of an Error and a Duty to
Investigate
The duty to correct an erroneous tax return position would not
arise until the taxpayer discovered the error or otherwise learned that
an error had been made. One commentator suggests placing the bur-
den on the IRS to prove that the taxpayer had "knowledge" of the er-
ror. But, if the IRS proved facts sufficient to establish that a
"reasonable person" would have known of the error, then the burden
would shift to the taxpayer to prove an absence of knowledge.65 It was
not suggested, however, that a taxpayer lacking knowledge of the er-
ror, but suspecting an error, should have a duty to investigate.
The duty to amend might be limited to situations where the tax-
payer acquired knowledge of the need to correct an error, such as by
communication from the taxpayer's accountant or other tax return
preparer. In the alternative, the taxpayer might be charged with a
duty to investigate suspected errors in appropriate circumstances. In-
cluding the tax return positions subject to the § 6662 accuracy penalty
within the definition of error provides an avenue for imposing a duty
to investigate.
Suppose, for example, the taxpayer acquired information that
made her realize there was a good chance that a position taken on her
original return was erroneous. The taxpayer could not be certain that
the position claimed was erroneous until she reexamined the original
return. Further, assuming an error was made, the taxpayer would be
uncertain whether the error was sufficiently "material" to require an
amended return to be filed.
The negligence penalty of § 6662(b)(1) applies to an erroneous orig-
inal return position that results from the taxpayer's failure to make a
727, 728-29 (1980); United States v. Franks, 723 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (10th Cir.
1983)).
64. For example, I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) provides for the carryback and carryover of a
net operating loss; I.R.C. § 1212 provides for the carryback and carryover of capi-
tal losses; I.R.C. § 170(b) and I.R.C. § 170(d) provide for the carryover of excess
charitable contributions.
65. Harris, supra note 1, at 538.
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"reasonable attempt" to comply with the tax laws.66 The judicial stan-
dard is whether a reasonably prudent taxpayer would behave as this
taxpayer did.67 An ongoing duty to correctly self-report implies that
conduct penalizable in connection with the original return should be
equally penalizable in connection with filing, or failing to file, an
amended return. Therefore, if the taxpayer's failure to investigate
further departed from the behavior expected of a reasonably prudent
taxpayer, then the taxpayer's failure to investigate could be treated as
§ 6662 negligence if in fact the original return position constituted a
material error. The taxpayer's failure to investigate a suspected ma-
terial error, if it departed from the behavior expected of a reasonably
prudent taxpayer, would constitute penalizable negligence even if the
taxpayer was not negligent in claiming the original return position.
In other words, the duty to amend based on knowledge of an error
could be broadened to include a correlative duty to investigate in ap-
propriate circumstances.
A duty to investigate delimited only by the "reasonably prudent
taxpayer" standard would render the scope of the duty somewhat un-
certain. This would leave the taxpayer in doubt in some circum-
stances about whether or not the duty was applicable. The existence
of the duty, however, would expose a taxpayer who later suspected
that a material reporting error was committed to the same risk of pen-
alty faced by a taxpayer who suspected the possibility of error while
preparing the return, but who chose not to investigate. This parity is
consistent with a filing obligation that extends for a continuous pe-
riod, beginning with the original return due date and ending with the
expiration of the limitations period for the taxable year, and thus
seems to be a worthy accompaniment to the duty to amend. The en-
actment of a duty to correct errors of which the taxpayer acquired
knowledge would be appropriate, however, even if not accompanied by
a correlative duty to investigate suspected errors.
An unfulfilled duty to amend or investigate would enable the IRS
to assert penalizable conduct occurring at any time within the period
of limitations, not simply conduct occurring prior to the original re-
turn due date. As a practical matter, however, the IRS may seldom
know when a taxpayer acquires knowledge or suspicion of an error.
Therefore, the duty to amend or investigate would most likely affect
the behavior of a taxpayer who (1) was informed by a tax adviser that
an error existed that required correction, (2) was informed by a tax
adviser that an error was strongly suspected and that further investi-
66. I.R.C. § 6662(c).
67. "In measuring taxpayer negligence, the courts have generally applied the 'reason-
ably prudent person' standard of tort law, inquiring whether a reasonably pru-
dent taxpayer would act as the taxpayer did under similar circumstances."
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 14, § 202.3.1.1, at 51.
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gation was required, or (3) independently discovered the error or pos-
sibility of error; knew of the duty to amend or investigate; and
believed in complying with the law regardless of the IRS's ability to
detect noncompliance.
IV. AMENDED RETURN OBLIGATION AND THE
PENALTY STRUCTURE
If a legal duty to amend known material errors is enacted, which
might or might not be accompanied by a legal duty to investigate sus-
pected material errors, the questions arising include: (1) how, if at all,
the taxpayer's compliance with the duty to amend should ameliorate
the taxpayer's exposure to penalties for original return errors, and (2)
what penalties should apply to a breach of the duty to amend or, if
enacted, the duty to investigate. The approach undertaken in this Ar-
ticle is to identify characteristics that a good penalty structure-a nor-
mative penalty structure-usually should possess. A penalty
structure with these characteristics will be referred to as a parity
structure. It is possible to construct a penalty parity structure that
incorporates the civil and criminal penalties of existing law. The re-
sulting penalty parity structure can then be examined to see if, in all
cases, it is an appropriate penalty structure to accompany enactment
of a legal duty to amend.
The first step in this analysis is to describe briefly existing civil and
criminal penalties. A general description will suffice.
A. Current Penalty Structure
The Code provides for both civil and criminal penalties. The civil
penalties are monetary penalties; the criminal penalties are punish-
able by fine or imprisonment. The civil penalties include penalties for
both fraudulent and nonfraudulent misconduct, with higher monetary
penalties generally imposed for fraudulent misconduct than for non-
fraudulent misconduct.
The penalties relevant to the analysis of a desirable penalty struc-
ture that would enforce a legal duty to file amended returns are the
Code's penalties that are applied to a taxpayer's breach of a duty to
file and breach of a duty to accurately report tax-related items. A
monetary civil penalty for a nonfraudulent failure to file is imposed
under § 6651(a); a higher monetary civil penalty is imposed under
§ 6651(f) if the failure to file is fraudulent. The failure-to-file penalties
(nonfraudulent and fraudulent) are calibrated with reference both to
the amount of tax that should have been reported and the lateness of
the return.68 In addition to either of these penalties, a flat penalty of
68. See I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1). A nonfraudulent failure to file is subject to a penalty of
5% of the amount of tax required to be shown on the return for each month, or
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$500 may be imposed under § 6702 if an individual files a frivolous
return.69 This penalty may be viewed as an additional failure-to-file
penalty.
Inaccurate, but nonfraudulent, reporting of tax-related items is pe-
nalized under § 6662, which imposes a monetary penalty calculated as
twenty percent of the underpayment of tax resulting from certain
types of nonfraudulent reporting errors. Errors giving rise to the
§ 6662 penalty include errors attributable to negligence or disregard
of rules or regulations;7 0 errors in the form of a significant undervalu-
ation or overvaluation of property;7 1 and, in the case of income tax
returns, errors of any type that result in a "substantial understate-
ment" of tax liability. 7 2 Yet, to the extent that the inaccurate report-
ing of tax-related items is shown to be fraudulent,73 then the § 6662
penalty is inapplicable.74 Instead, a monetary penalty, calculated as
seventy-five percent of the underpayment of tax resulting from fraud-
ulent errors, is imposed under § 6663.75
The penalty for either a nonfraudulent failure to file or for commit-
ting nonfraudulent reporting errors is excused if the taxpayer can es-
tablish "reasonable cause" for failing to file76 or for committing the
reporting errors.7 7 It should be apparent from this profile of civil pen-
alties that the taxpayer can commit nonpenalizable "innocent" report-
ing errors. These might be reporting errors for which the taxpayer
can establish "reasonable cause." In the alternative, they might be
errors committed even though the taxpayer was not negligent, and
that resulted in a tax underpayment of insufficient magnitude to be
fraction of a month, by which the return is overdue, not to exceed 25% of the tax
required to be shown on the return. If the failure to file is fraudulent, the appli-
cable percentage is 15% per month (rather than 5%), not to exceed 75% of the tax
required to be shown on the return. Id. § 6651(f).
69. Id. § 6702.
70. See id. § 6662(b)(1).
71. See id. § 6662(b)(3), (b)(5), (e), (g).
72. Id. § 6662(b)(2), (d). See supra subsection IV.B.1, which defines "substantial un-
derstatement" and suggests it is a suitable measure of the materiality of errors
contained in any federal tax return, not only in federal income tax returns.
73. Civil tax fraud under I.R.C. § 6663 requires a showing that the taxpayer acted
with "the specific intent to evade a tax known or believed to be owing." WOLFMAN
ET AL., supra note 14, § 202.3.2, at 74 (citing Webb v. Commissioner, 394 F.2d 366
(5th Cir. 1968); Watson v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1601 (1988); Truesdell
v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1280 (1987)). Once the IRS establishes that any part of
an underpayment of tax is attributable to fraud, the entire underpayment is pre-
sumed attributable to fraud except to the extent the taxpayer can prove other-
wise by a preponderance of the evidence. I.R.C. § 6663(b).
74. I.R.C. § 6662(b).
75. Id. § 6663(a).
76. Id. § 6651(a)(1). The statute further provides the error must not be due to "will-
ful neglect." Id.
77. Id. § 6664(c)(1). The statute further provides that the taxpayer must have "acted
in good faith." Id.
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penalizable under § 6662 without regard to the culpability of the
taxpayer.
The criminal penalties set forth in the Code are contained in
§§ 7201 to 7217.78 The crimes relevant to a taxpayer's failure to file or
to accurately report tax-related items are listed in the following sec-
tions: § 7201, which punishes the willful attempt in any manner to
evade or defeat tax; § 7203, which punishes the willful failure to make
a return, keep records, or supply information by any person required
to do so under the Code; and § 7206(1), which penalizes the willful
filing of a false return, statement, or other document. 79 Each statute
specifies as an element of the crime that the taxpayer's conduct be
"willful." Willful is defined as "a voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty."8o
B. Penalties: A Normative Approach
1. Parity Structure Defined
One approach to the imposition of penalties is that a taxpayer who
voluntarily corrects an error made on the original return ought not be
penalized more than a taxpayer who avoids making the error in the
first instance. One condition on this approach is that the taxpayer
who fails to pay taxes because she committed the error must pay the
full tax amount plus interest and correct the error before the govern-
ment invests resources in investigating the taxpayer's return. A par-
ity structure will be referred to as a penalty system that waives
penalties for original return errors that are corrected on voluntary,
timely-filed amended returns, thereby placing the amending taxpay-
78. The subsequent discussion in this Article sometimes distinguishes between non-
fraudulent reporting errors and fraudulent reporting errors. Unless otherwise
specified, fraudulent errors include errors subject to either the I.R.C. § 6663 civil
fraud penalty or to criminal penalties; nonfraudulent errors are those subject to
the I.R.C. § 6662 penalty.
79. The following provisions are relied upon for the majority of tax prosecutions:
I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7203, and 7206, along with I.R.C. § 7602(2) (criminalizing the
willful aiding, assisting, or counseling of falsity or fraud). McGown, supra note
20, at 248. In addition, the Federal Criminal Code, which punishes perjury, con-
spiracies, false claims, and false statements, may be used to prosecute both tax
and nontax crimes. Id. at 247-48. See also 4 BrrrER & LOKKN, supra note 8,
114.9.1, at 114-79 n.3. Altogether, the arsenal of criminal statutes available to
prosecutors forms a "hodgepodge of overlapping sanctions." Id. % 114.9.1, at 114-
79.
80. 4 BrrrER & LOKIEN, supra note 8, 114.9.2, at 114-83 to 114-84 (citing United
States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976), both as authority that a voluntary, inten-
tional violation of a known legal duty is sufficient to establish willfulness and as
an indication that earlier references by the United States Supreme Court to "bad
faith" or "evil motive" "need not (and perhaps should not) be included in the
court's instructions to the jury").
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ers in parity with taxpayers avoiding the errors in the first instance.S1
A penalty parity structure in this situation reflects a "no harm, no
foul" approach to the imposition of penalties. A taxpayer whose timely
amended return avoids harm to government or society (in the form of
governmental costs expended to secure the taxpayer's compliance) has
committed no foul and should not be penalized.8 2
Similarly, it might be maintained that a taxpayer who negligently
(or fraudulently) falls to amend her return should be subject to the
same penalties as-that is, placed in parity with-a taxpayer who
negligently (or fraudulently) submitted her original return. Under
this view, for example, a taxpayer who innocently commits an error on
the original return, but who fraudulently perpetuates the error by fail-
ing to file an obligatory amended return is in no better position than a
taxpayer who fraudulently commits the error on the original return.
To the extent a system of penalties has this effect, it is a parity
structure.
In summary, under a parity structure, the taxpayer can be viewed
as having an ongoing duty to correctly report her tax liability through-
out the duration of the limitations period. The taxpayer's filings dur-
ing this period are to be viewed as constituting only a single tax
return. The amended return, if any, should be treated as an appendix
or supplemental schedule to this tax return.8 3 Penalties applicable to
tax return errors are determined based on the return as it existed at
81. The term reflects the parity of treatment between (1) taxpayers who do not com-
mit errors that require correction, and (2) taxpayers who commit errors but cor-
rect them on a timely basis. As may be evident, the taxpayer cannot know at the
time of submission of an amended return that the government has not already
expended resources to investigate her erroneous return. In this Article, as ex-
plained infra subsection IV.C.1, an amended return filed before "the taxpayer is
first contacted by the Internal Revenue Service concerning an examination of the
return" (i.e., a qualified amended return as defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-
2(c)(3)(i) (1991)) substitutes for the expenditure of governmental resources as the
test for whether an amended return is "voluntary" and "timely-filed."
82. Interest, which would not be forgiven under a parity structure, compensates the
government for its temporary loss of use of any unpaid taxes that result from the
taxpayer's original return error. If this compensation is deemed inadequate, the
solution is a higher interest rate, not the imposition of a penalty. If the taxpayer
who properly reports additional tax fails to pay the additional tax due, the civil
penalty of I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2) for failure to pay tax and the criminal penalties of
I.R.C. §§ 7201 and 7203 would remain applicable according to their terms and
would not be waived.
83. In Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386 (1984), discussed supra text accom-
panying notes 11-12, the Supreme Court's analysis distinguished an amended
return from the original return, concluding that the original return was the "re-
turn" to which I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1) made reference. This view was criticized by
Douglas A. Kahn, The Supreme Court's Misconstruction of a Procedural Statute-
A Critique of the Court's Decision in Badaracco, 82 MICH. L. REv. 461, 468
(1983)("Thus, the Supreme Court's characterization of an original and amended
return as two returns is erroneous. There is only one return-the original re-
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the time of commencement of an IRS audit of the taxpayer. Further,
penalties are determined on the basis of the positions reflected on that
return (including any appendices or supplements) and on the basis of
the taxpayer's knowledge of and conduct with respect to those return
positions as of the commencement of the audit. Thus, parity offers
both the appeal of equal treatment for similarly situated taxpayers
and the consistent treatment of culpable conduct regardless of
whether the culpable conduct occurs at the time of filing of the original
return or at some later time within the limitations period.
2. Existing Penalties Contrasted with a Parity Structure
Current penalties do not always achieve parity. For example, if a
taxpayer submits a fraudulent original return that is timely followed
by a corrected, nonfraudulent amended return, the taxpayer remains
subject to the fraud penalty under current law.8 4 This does not
achieve parity. A parity structure would treat the amending taxpayer
no differently than a taxpayer whose original return was nonfraudu-
lent. On the other hand, a negligent error cured by a timely submitted
amended return absolves the taxpayer from the negligence penalty
under current law.8 5 In this situation, the existing penalty structure
does achieve parity.
Since no duty to amend exists under current law,8 6 the law gener-
ally does not penalize a taxpayer for return errors based on the tax-
payer's postfiling knowledge or conduct.8 7 Parity generally is not
achieved in this situation because different consequences are assigned
to taxpayer conduct accompanying an error depending on whether the
conduct precedes or follows submission of the original return. For ex-
turn, as it reads before being modified by the amendment and as it reads
afterwards.").
84. As an evidentiary matter, a timely corrected amended return may cast doubt on
whether the taxpayer acted with fraudulent intent when filing the original re-
turn. Nonetheless, if the existence of original return fraud is established, the
amended return does not vitiate exposure to the fraud penalty. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6664-2(c)(2) (1991)(denying the benefits of a "qualified amended return" to
fraudulent positions). See also George M. Still, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.
1072, 1077 (1953)("[A] taxpayer who has filed a fraudulent return may not, by
subsequently filing an amended return and paying the tax due, bar the respon-
dent from assessing additions to tax for fraud."), affd, 218 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.
1955); Rev. Rul. 56-54, 1956-1 C.B. 654 (upholding the application of the civil
fraud penalty under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 even though the taxpayer
filed delinquent returns showing the correct tax liability).
85. The amended return is "timely submitted" if it is a "qualified amended return"
that requires submission before "[t]he time the taxpayer is first contacted by the
Internal Revenue Service concerning an examination of the return." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6664-2(c)(3)(i) (1991). For further discussion, see infra subsection IV.C.1.
86. See supra section IA.
87. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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ample, in Broadhead v. Commissioner,8S the taxpayer's refusal to file
an amended return prepared by his accountant did not convert an
originally innocent error into a fraudulent error. Under parity it
would do so, presuming that the taxpayer's like refusal to report the
proper amount of taxable income on an original return prepared by
the accountant would constitute fraud.
The next question to address is the extent to which a parity pen-
alty system might be appropriate under an obligatory amended return
regime. Section IV.C addresses this question in the context of a tax-
payer who complies with a legal duty to amend. In this context, the
issue is the extent to which the amended return should mitigate or
eliminate the taxpayer's exposure to penalties based on errors made
on the original return. It is useful to consider separately cases in
which the original return errors are nonfraudulent (undertaken in
subsection IV.C.1) and cases in which the original return errors are
fraudulent (undertaken in subsection IV.C.2).
C. Penalty Recommendations: Obligatory Amended Returns
Filed
1. Abrogation of Penalty Exposure for Nonfraudulent Errors
Voluntarily Corrected
Although current law does not require taxpayers to correct report-
ing errors made on the original return, a taxpayer who files a timely
amended return correcting nonfraudulent original return errors elimi-
nates her exposure to penalties arising from her commission of these
errors. Specifically, the taxpayer's nonfraudulent original return er-
rors, if subject to penalty at all, are penalized under § 6662, the Code's
accuracy-related penalty. Treasury regulations promulgated under
§ 6664 permit a "qualified amended return"8 9 to negate the § 6662
penalty otherwise applicable to nonfraudulent errors. A "qualified
amended return" is an amended return filed before "[t]he time the tax-
payer is first contacted by the Internal Revenue Service concerning an
examination of the return."90 This rule should be continued to secure
88. 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 1284 (1955). For further discussion of Broadhead, see supra
text accompanying notes 21-24.
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-2(c)(2), (3) (1991).
90. Id. § 1.6664-2(c)(3)(i). A taxpayer's amended return is not a qualified amended
return with respect to items reported in accord with instructions provided by a
pass-through entity (such as a partnership or S corporation) unless it is filed
before the pass-through entity is first contacted by the IRS in connection with an
examination of the return to which the pass-through item relates. See id.
§ 1.6664-2(c)(3)(iii). Similarly, the taxpayer's amended return is not a qualified
amended return with respect to tax shelter items for which the taxpayer claimed
a benefit on the return, unless it is fied before the tax shelter promoter (or any
other person exposed to penalty under I.R.C. § 6700(a)) is first contacted by the
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parity if amended returns to correct material errors become
obligatory.
If qualified amended returns continue to negate penalties for non-
fraudulent errors once a legal duty to amend is adopted, the resulting
penalty structure conforms to a parity structure. In short, the tax-
payer filing the qualified amended return will be subject to the same
penalty (none) that she would have faced had the corrected position
been originally reported. This relief from exposure to penalties for
nonfraudulent errors should encourage taxpayers to correct their orig-
inal return mistakes, an incentive that exists under current law.
Clearly, an amended return filed after the taxpayer is notified of an
IRS audit cannot be allowed to exempt the taxpayer from nonfraudu-
lent civil penalties. Otherwise, taxpayers would make sport of the
Code's penalties for nonfraudulent reporting errors. Taxpayers would
decline to amend their returns unless audited. Once audited,
amended returns would be filed negating the imposition of penalties.9 '
Note that a qualified amended return currently absolves the tax-
payer from penalties attributable to nonfraudulent errors whether or
not these corrected errors are material. Upon adoption of a legal duty
to amend, qualified amended returns should continue to be given this
effect to secure parity even if the errors corrected are not material and
no duty to amend arises.
2. Nonabrogation of Penalty Exposure for Fraudulent Errors
The analysis is quite different if the original return error is fraudu-
lent. Under current law, a qualified amended return that corrects the
original return error neither mitigates nor eliminates the taxpayer's
exposure to civil or criminal fraud penalties.92 Thus, existing law
does not attempt parity between (1) a taxpayer who commits original
return fraud and then repents and amends before the onset of an IRS
audit, and (2) a taxpayer who commits no fraud on the original return.
At least four arguments can be marshaled in favor of the continua-
tion of current rules rather than adoption of a parity structure if
amended returns become required. These arguments favor continuing
to exclude civil and criminal fraud penalties from original return pen-
alties waived by the timely filing of an obligatory amended return.
IRS concerning an examination of the tax shelter activity. See id. § 1.6664-
2(c)(3)(ii).
91. See George M. Still, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1072, 1077 (1953)(reaching the
similar conclusion that a nonfraudulent amended return filed after commence-
ment of an IRS audit could not be permitted to preempt the IRS's imposition of
civil fraud penalties), affd, 218 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1955).
92. See supra note 84 for a discussion of civil penalties. Tax crimes, like other
crimes, are punishable once the elements of the offense have been satisfied and
cannot be negated by subsequent repentant behavior.
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The arguments are generally inapplicable, however, to the timely cor-
rection of nonfraudulent errors. The arguments are as follows: (1) im-
munizing the taxpayer from fraud charges would undermine the
taxpayer's obligation to file a correct original return; (2) taxpayers
committing fraud are less deserving of relief than taxpayers commit-
ting nonfraudulent original return errors; (3) any adverse impact on
tax revenues from nonwaiver of civil or criminal penalties for fraudu-
lent original returns is likely to be minimal; and (4) it is difficult to
formulate a workable rule that exculpates the taxpayer from criminal
fraud penalties that is not subject to abuse by taxpayers who file
fraudulent original returns. These arguments will be considered
sequentially.
a. Immunization from Fraud Penalties Undermining the
Duty to File a Correct Return
As noted in a 1989 IRS report on penalty reform,9 3 penalties set
and validate standards of taxpayer behavior. The standard of behav-
ior expected of all taxpayers is that they file correct original returns.
Nonfraudulent errors, even if culpable, are essentially unintentional
violations. That is, the taxpayer, although perhaps careless or even
grossly negligent, does not knowingly file an incorrect return. Fraud-
ulent reporting errors are intentional errors, 94 which if excused would
have the effect of endorsing a lower standard of behavior: taxpayers
may file returns they know to be incorrect if the errors are corrected
before the IRS has an opportunity to commence audits of the taxpay-
ers.95 Thus, validation of the standard of reporting expected on the
original return militates in favor of nonabatement of penalties for tax-
payer fraud.
b. Lesser Appeal of Relief for Taxpayers Committing Fraud
A closely allied argument is that original return fraud is a more
culpable offense and seemingly less deserving of relief than non-
fraudulent original return errors. Current regulations, which allow a
qualified amended return to negate civil penalties for nonfraudulent
errors but not civil penalties for fraudulent errors, can be justified by
the greater severity of fraudulent offenses.
93. IRS Penalty Study, supra note 1, ch. 3.
94. See supra note 73.
95. Since, as a practical matter, some delay is inevitable before the commencement of
an audit, this lower reporting standard would effectively require the government
to make short-term loans to any taxpayer desiring to receive one.
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c. Fraud Penalty Relief Unlikely to Enhance Tax Compliance
The primary reason to impose a duty to correct material original
return errors is to clarify taxpayers' obligations to correctly determine
and disclose their tax liabilities, not only on filing day, but for a con-
tinuous period ending only with the expiration of the limitations pe-
riod for the taxable year. Taxpayers risking civil or criminal fraud
penalties by willfully and knowingly violating reporting standards on
filing day appear unlikely to be lured into filing nonfraudulent returns
within the limitations period by the promise of amnesty from these
penalties. Therefore, little negative impact can be expected from re-
taining taxpayers' exposure to civil and criminal fraud penalties even
though they file timely amended returns correcting their original re-
turn errors. By contrast, taxpayers committing nonfraudulent origi-
nal return errors, as a group, should be far more likely to comply with
reporting obligations if such penalties are waived.
d. Difficulty of Formulating a Workable Rule that Waives
Criminal Fraud Penalties
An offer of amnesty from charges of criminal fraud raises special
concerns. Many criminal tax fraud charges brought against individu-
als are the culmination of an investigative process that originates
with an investigation of an occupation, industry, or geographic area.9 6
The investigation might have been triggered initially by information
acquired by IRS or other governmental personnel or by investigative
news reporters.
Suppose such a broad-based investigation was under way and a
taxpayer who committed tax fraud and learned of or suspected the
existence of the investigation filed a nonfraudulent amended return
before the IRS contacted the taxpayer. A substantial portion of the
IRS's criminal investigative efforts would be defeated if such an
amended return was permitted to immunize this taxpayer from crimi-
nal prosecution.
Other difficulties would be encountered if a narrower exculpatory
rule was promulgated. For example, consider a rule immunizing from
96. MICHAEL I. SALTZmAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 12.03[1][b], at 12-12 (2d
ed. 1991). These broad-based investigations, conducted by "special agents" of the
IRS's Criminal Investigation Division, are termed "general" investigations. Id. at
S12-4 to S12-6 (Cum. Supp. No. 1 1997). Individuals identified in a "general"
investigation as likely candidates for criminal tax prosecution become the targets
of a "primary" investigation. Id.
Either a general or primary investigation may arise from the IRS's General
Enforcement Program (GEP), which is designed to provide "some coverage of all
types of taxes and violators in as many income brackets, occupations and busi-
nesses, and geographic areas as possible" or from the IRS's Special Enforcement
Program (SEP), which focuses on taxpayers deriving income from illegal activi-
ties or sources. Id. [ 12.02[2], at 12-6.
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criminal prosecution taxpayers whose amended returns were "volun-
tary" and not triggered by knowledge, suspicion, or fear of an IRS au-
dit. These difficulties were illuminated by a "formal" voluntary
disclosure policy in effect from 1945 to 1952.97 Under the formal pol-
icy, taxpayers who voluntarily disclosed tax deficiencies and who fully
cooperated with the government in the determination and payment of
the correct tax were not recommended to the Department of Justice
for criminal prosecution, although penalties for delinquency, negli-
gence, or civil fraud were not necessarily waived. While termed a "for-
mal" policy, the policy was not directed by statute. Instead, the policy
was administratively conceived, implemented, and publicized through
a series of pronouncements.9 8 This policy led to extensive litigation by
taxpayers who were subject to criminal prosecution. These taxpayers
sought to suppress the information provided to the IRS on amended
tax returns (often provided well after an investigation had begun), al-
legedly relying on the voluntary disclosure policy.9 9 The litigation
bred by the formal policy and the confusion over its scope led to its
termination by the IRS in 1952.100
97. Id. 12.03[3] [c], at 12-35. The policy originated in 1934 as a "confidential inter-
nal practice," and was not disclosed to the public until 1945. Bruton, supra note
1, § 53.07, at 53-22 to 53-23 n.77.
98. Gerald L. Wallace, Penalties and Prosecutions for Evasion of the Federal Income
Tax, 1 TAX L. Rav. 329, 341-42 (1946). See also Bruton, supra note 1, § 53.07, at
53-22 to 53-24. Prominent among these was the statement by Secretary of the
Treasury Vinson, providing in part:
No honest American need fear this drive against tax evaders. No one
is going to jail for an honest mistake in filling out his tax return. Treas-
ury policy even permits the willful evader to escape prosecution if he
repents in time. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue does not recom-
mend criminal prosecution in the case of any taxpayer who makes a vol-
untary disclosure of omission or other misstatement in his tax return or
of failure to make a tax return. Monetary penalties may be imposed for
delinquency, for negligence and for fraud, but the man who makes a dis-
closure before an investigation is under way protects himself and his
family from the stigma of a felony conviction. And there is nothing com-
plicated about going to a collector or other revenue officer and simply
saying, "There is something wrong with my return and I want to
straighten it out."
Wallace, supra, at 342 (quoting the Washington Post, Aug. 21, 1945).
99. See SALTzmAN, supra note 96, 12.03[3][c], at 12-36 nn.77-81. See also Bruton,
supra note 1, § 53.07, at 53-24 n.80 ("All too frequently, taxpayers who learned,
accidentally or otherwise, that their returns were being audited would attempt to
make a 'voluntary' disclosure in order to avoid prosecution. The official view in
such cases was that the disclosure would be treated as voluntary unless the Bu-
reau could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the taxpayer did have knowl-
edge of the pending investigation at the time he made his disclosures." (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 82-2518, at 11 (1953))).
100. SAL 'A, supra note 96, 12.03 [3] [c], at 12-36. See also Harris, supra note 1, at
550 ([This formal policy was abandoned in 1952 in reaction to increasing litiga-
tion regarding the timeliness of the disclosure and the definition of commence-
ment of investigation by the Service." (citations omitted)).
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Since then, the IRS has maintained an "informal" voluntary disclo-
sure policy that provides no guarantees of nonprosecution. Neverthe-
less, significant factors that are likely to influence the IRS not to
recommend prosecution to the Department of Justice include (1) the
taxpayer's voluntary disclosure of unpaid tax, and (2) the taxpayer's
full cooperation with the IRS in ascertaining and paying the correct
tax to the extent of the taxpayer's ability to pay.iOl
The difficulties encountered under the formal voluntary disclosure
policy illustrate the risks involved in adopting a formal rule that ex-
culpates taxpayers who file voluntary amended returns from criminal
fraud charges.1 0 2
3. Countervailing Considerations
The foregoing arguments against permitting a corrected amended
return to mitigate a taxpayer's exposure to penalties for civil or crimi-
nal fraud committed on the original return are inconclusive. It is also
necessary to ask (1) whether it is appropriate to require amended re-
turns of taxpayers and then impose civil fraud charges or prosecute
them for criminal fraud partially on the basis of information contained
in the amended returns, and (2) whether taxpayers committing non-
fraudulent original return errors might hesitate to comply with an
amended return obligation for fear of a mistaken assertion of civil or
criminal fraud penalties by an overzealous IRS. These are legitimate
In 1986, the Senate Finance Committee proposed to include, as part of the Tax
Reform Bill of 1986, a statutory formal voluntary disclosure policy not considered
by the House of Representatives. S. REP. No. 99-313, at 211-12 (1986)(discussing
H.R. 3838, 99th Cong. (1986)). The proposal was narrowly defeated by the
United States Senate. 132 CONG. REc. 14,779 (1986). The proposed legislation
would have provided immunity from criminal prosecution for tax violations if dis-
closure was made "to the Secretary of the Treasury or his designee before notice
of an inquiry or investigation into the taxpayer's tax affairs is given to the tax-
payer (or a related party) by the Internal Revenue Service, any other law enforce-
ment agency, or any tax administration agency." I.R.C. § 559 (proposed form),
reprinted in Bruton, supra note 1, § 53.07[1], at 53-29.
101. SALTZnAN, supra note 96, 12.03[3][c], at 12-36 to 12-37 & S12-13 to S12-15
(Cum. Supp. No. 1 1997). See also Bruton, supra note 1, § 53.07, at 53-26 (con-
trasting "volumes of litigation" under the formal policy with "only one reported
decision [United States v. Hebel, 668 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 946 (1982)] in nearly 30 years of use" of the informal policy). Hebel held that
the IRS's informal policy conferred upon the taxpayer no rights to nonprosecution
regardless of whether the taxpayer's cooperation with the IRS was voluntary.
United States v. Hebel, 668 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1982).
102. See Bruton, supra note 1, § 53.07, at 53-24 n.80 ("Regardless of the possible mer-
its of the policy, however, it is clear... that the difficulties of administering [the
formal policy] were all but insuperable." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 82-2518, at 11
(1953))). See also SALTrZLN, supra note 96, % 12.03[3] [c], at 12-36 n.83 ("One of
the major obstacles in formalizing a voluntary disclosure policy is the difficulty in
drafting a regulation or statute that would not have the same defects as the origi-
nal Treasury policy-i.e., defining when a disclosure is voluntary.").
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concerns, but neither justifies an automatic waiver of civil fraud or
criminal penalties for a taxpayer filing a qualified amended return.
a. Fairness of Compelling Taxpayers to Provide Evidence of
Fraudulent Conduct
The appropriateness of the government's use of required returns to
support the imposition of fraud penalties apparently is not a constitu-
tional issue,'0 3 but instead is a matter of "fairness." The Corneel Pro-
posalio4 noted that "a majority of the members of the Committee on
Standards of Tax Practice [of the ABA Tax Section] believed that, re-
gardless of Fifth Amendment concerns,1 0 5 it would be undesirable for
the Service to insist on amended returns and then to play 'gotcha' with
the taxpayer."1o6
The privilege against self-incrimination is a constitutional privi-
lege, and it would seem material for purposes of evaluating the consti-
tutionality or fairness of obligatory amended return that prosecutorial
use of information reported on a compelled original return does not
violate the privilege. The taxpayer would be required only to file the
amended return; the taxpayer would be entitled to claim the privilege,
if necessary, on the amended return just as she could have claimed the
privilege on the original return. Thus, although the amended return
would be required, incriminating information disclosed on the return
would be submitted voluntarily since the taxpayer would have been
privileged to suppress this information. In other words, a taxpayer
fraudulently filing an original return and charged with a legal obliga-
tion to amend would face a quandary not distinguishable from the
quandary facing a taxpayer who has accepted illegal income that the
taxpayer is charged with reporting on an original return. If it is fair,
as well as constitutional, to require the latter taxpayer to file an origi-
nal return-the current posture of the law-then it should be equally
fair, as well as constitutional, to require the former taxpayer to file an
amended return.
Moreover, it is not clear that "fairness" dictates that criminal tax
behavior be treated as though it was a game in which the truth is to be
suppressed unless ascertained from preapproved sources. The Fifth
103. See supra note 43.
104. Supra note 38.
105. A 1986 memorandum from Corneel to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Ser-
vice argued that the required filing of amended returns would not violate the
Fifth Amendment even without protection from subsequent criminal prosecution.
Corneel Proposal, supra note 38, reprinted in Harris, supra note 1, app. at 562-
63.
106. Id. Harris endorsed this sentiment, advocating a "limited use immunity" provi-
sion that would preclude the government from using information obtained from a
required amended return in its prosecution of the taxpayer. Harris, supra note 1,
at 555-57.
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has its underpin-
nings in coerced confessions.l0 7  Coercion is objectionable because it
demeans the individual and yields evidence of questionable validity.
If the taxpayer's original return is already a criminally false report,
then, as will be explained in subsection IV.D.2, the taxpayer would not
be exposed to additional criminal penalties as a result of the tax-
payer's noncompliance with the duty to amend.10S Therefore, the tax-
payer would not be coerced by the threat of increased sanctions to file
an amended return; the taxpayer would retain the Fifth Amendment
privilege to avoid including incriminating information on the amended
return if one was filed. In short, if a taxpayer did amend, and if the
nonfraudulent amended return was used to facilitate criminal prose-
cution, the self-incrimination would not arise from circumstances
analogous to the principles that led to the disfavor of self-incriminat-
ing evidence.
Additional reassurance that the IRS's use of information disclosed
on required amended returns probably would be "fair" stems from the
IRS's current reluctance under its "informal" voluntary disclosure pol-
icy to prosecute cases in which the taxpayer has voluntarily disclosed
past noncompliance.1 0 9 Currently, even if the taxpayer's original re-
turn clearly reflects criminal fraud, prosecuting a taxpayer whose cor-
rect amended return was not induced by knowledge of an IRS
investigation presents "significant trial hazards, since a disclosure is
evidence from which a finder of fact may determine that the original
act or omission was not 'willful' in a criminal sense."' 1 0 The same
trial hazards, as well as a continuation of the IRS's "informal" volun-
tary disclosure policy, would make unlikely the prosecution of taxpay-
ers who voluntarily complied with a legal duty to correct their returns.
The unusual case in which the IRS and Department of Justice would
decide to press forward with criminal prosecution, based substantially
on information disclosed on an obligatory amended return, would
likely involve sufficiently repugnant taxpayer conduct such that the
decision to prosecute would be "fair."
107. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FFTH A END~mNT (MacMillan
1986)(1968).
108. Although the potentially applicable criminal penalties would not change, it might
be easier in some situations for the government to prove a criminal failure to file
a required amended return than a criminal falsification of the original return.
109. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
110. SALImAN, supra note 96, 12.0313][c], at 12-37. See also Bruton, supra note 1,
§ 53.07, at 53-25 ("A true voluntary disclosure is a particularly unattractive case
for the government to use as an example to deter other taxpayers [sic] criminal
conduct. Rather than deterring the initial crime, routine prosecution of such
cases might actually deter remedial actions that are, in fact, beneficial to the tax
system.").
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If concerns about using information on compelled returns to fur-
ther criminal prosecution are resolved satisfactorily, the same argu-
ments should resolve concerns about the use of this information to
impose the less onerous civil fraud penalties. Moreover, the privilege
against self-incrimination is unavailable in civil litigation.lil This
should eliminate concerns about the propriety of imposing civil fraud
penalties based on information disclosed on obligatory amended
returns.
b. Inhibiting Effect on Taxpayers Who Fear Innocent Errors
Will Be Treated as Fraudulent
A potentially more significant concern is whether taxpayers com-
mitting nonfraudulent errors might decline to file required amended
returns out of concern that the IRS would perceive their errors as
fraudulent and seek to impose civil or criminal fraud penalties.
Under current policy, substantial numbers of cases of apparent tax
evasion are passed over by the government. Instead, the government
chooses to focus its resources on the most aggravated cases of criminal
fraud that offer the greatest likelihood of successful prosecution. A
leading treatise' 1 2 summarizes the selection process in the following
terms:
In the audit process, the IRS unearths far more cases exuding an aroma of
tax evasion than can be prosecuted, given the limited funds earmarked for the
extensive investigations and prosecutorial efforts required to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as the clogged channels through which
cases must move while being reviewed by the IRS, the Department of Justice,
and the U.S. Attorneys throughout the country. At each stage, the case must
be placed on a seamless spectrum of tax delinquency, which begins at one end
with taxpayers who resolve all doubts in their own favor, are negligent, fail to
keep records, or engage in shabby but not heinous conduct and which consists
at the other end of aggravated cases of deliberate omissions, false statements,
destruction of records, and payoffs to government officials. In deciding when
delinquency should be prosecuted and when a civil penalty is sufficient, the
IRS and the Department of Justice screen cases at several levels in order to
weed out the weak ones. Both agencies are interested in the deterrent effect
of publicity as well as in retributive punishment.- 1 3
In light of this emphasis on "aggravated cases," the chances should
be fairly remote that a taxpayer who is not guilty of criminal fraud
would be misperceived as having engaged in fraudulent conduct. As
noted, the existence of an amended return not induced by an IRS in-
vestigation would itself be a significant factor tending to remove the
taxpayer from the "aggravated cases" category." 4
111. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 121(a) (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992).
112. 4 BrIMrR & LOKKEN, supra note 8.
113. Id. 114.9.1, at 114-80 (footnote omitted).
114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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It is also relevant that current Treasury regulations encourage the
filing of amended returns to correct errors. Substantial numbers of
taxpayers do so, even though the amending taxpayers have no guaran-
tee that the IRS will not seek to impose civil fraud or criminal penal-
ties. It is hard to see how the overall level of taxpayer compliance
would decline if the aspirational standard embodied in the regulations
was made mandatory.
D. Penalty Recommendations: Breaches of a Duty to Amend
The discussion in section IV.C endorsed, under an obligatory
amended return regime, a continuation of policies currently applicable
to taxpayers who voluntarily correct original return errors. Specifi-
cally, nonfraudulent penalties would be waived if the taxpayer filed a
qualified amended return; penalties for civil or criminal fraud would
not be waived automatically, but would remain imposable at the IRS's
discretion. The other important issue to be addressed is what penal-
ties should apply when taxpayers fail to comply with the duty to
amend.
A taxpayer filing an erroneous original return normally will not be
subject to the § 6651(a)(1) failure-to-file penalty.115 Under an obliga-
tory amended return regime, the amended return might be viewed as
a separate "return," in which case the failure to file an obligatory
amended return would trigger the failure-to-file penalty.1 1 6 A more
integrated approach, however, adopts the view expressed by Professor
Katn:117 only one "return" is filed and any amended returns are
treated as supplements or appendices to the original return. Under
this view, the failure-to-file penalty would remain irrelevant under an
obligatory amended return regime since a "return" (the original re-
turn) would constitute the required filing. The applicable penalty for
breach of the duty to amend would be determined with reference to
the degree of noncompliance with the reporting standardsllS con-
tained in § 6662, which penalizes nonfraudulent reporting errors, and
115. See supra section IVA for a discussion of the failure-to-file penalty and other
current Code penalties. The failure-to-file penalty may apply if the filed return is
frivolous or is so lacking in requisite information that it does not qualify as a
"return." See generally 4 BrrrEER & LOKKEN, supra note 8, 111.1.8 (discussing
the consequences of filing returns that are deficient, skeletal, or tentative).
116. The Corneel Proposal adopted this approach, but only if the failure to file the
amended return was "willfl" and no failure-to-file penalty attached to the origi-
nal return. Corneel Proposal, supra note 38, reprinted in Harris, supra note 1, at
540 & app. at 572-73.
117. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
118. See supra section VA for a discussion of current reporting standards, including
I.R.C. §§ 6662 and 6663.
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§ 6663, which penalizes errors attributable to fraud.119 This Article
favors Professor Kahn's more integrated concept of what constitutes a
"return" for purposes of determining applicable penalties under an ob-
ligatory amended return regime.
1. A Parity Structure Favored
A penalty parity structurei 2o equitably recognizes that if taxpay-
ers have a continuous duty, extending from the date of filing until ex-
piration of the period of limitations, to correctly report their tax
liabilities, a breach of this duty should result in the same exposure to
penalty regardless of when the breach occurs. For example, a tax-
payer might commit a material but nonnegligent error on the original
return. This error would not be subject to the "substantial understate-
ment" penalty of § 6662(b)(2) if the taxpayer had "reasonable
cause"12 ' for the resulting underpayment of tax.J22 In this case, the
original return error would not be a penalizable error. Suppose, more-
over, that within the period of limitations the taxpayer discovered the
error and thus was subject to the duty to amend. Although the com-
mission of the error was not penalizable, the taxpayer's failure to cor-
rect the error under a parity structure might, depending on the
circumstances, result in one of the following consequences: constitute
negligence subjecting the taxpayer to the negligence penalty;12 3 lack
reasonable cause subjecting the taxpayer to the substantial underpay-
ment penalty;1 2 4 or constitute a fraudulent attempt to evade tax sub-
119. For example, an I.R.C. § 6651(f) fraudulent failure to file an amended return
would be treated as an I.R.C. § 6663 fraudulent misreporting of the items on the
return. If, however, the "material" error had no impact on tax liability (see supra
subsection H.B.3), a penalty of a fixed amount for a fraudulent failure to file an
obligatory amended return would be appropriate, as would a penalty of a lesser
fixed amount for a negligent failure to file an obligatory amended return.
120. See supra subsection IV.B.1.
121. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).
122. See supra section IV.A for a discussion of civil penalties applicable to nonfraudu-
lent errors.
123. An example might be careless inattention to the duty to amend even though the
taxpayer had knowledge of a material error that she was obligated to correct.
The test, applying the negligence standard of tort law, would be whether a "rea-
sonably prudent person" would have amended the return in a like situation. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text.
124. Presumably, if the taxpayer did have "reasonable cause" for her failure to
amend-perhaps, for example, because of illness-the same factor or factors es-
tablishing "reasonable cause" would also establish that the taxpayer was not neg-
ligent so that the I.R.C. § 6662 penalty would be inapplicable.
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jecting the taxpayer to the civil fraud penalty 2 5 or, in sufficiently
egregious circumstances, to criminal prosecution.' 2 6
Is there any reason not to favor a parity structure? Is there any
reason, for example, to disfavor criminalizing an error that originally
was an innocent error if the taxpayer knowingly and willfully perpetu-
ates the error, as this exhibits conduct that would have constituted
tax evasion if it had been responsible for the original misreporting?
One commentator finds as the most disturbing aspect of obligatory
amended returns the prospect "that individuals who make uninten-
tional errors on returns could later be claimed to have committed a
crime by failing to file an amended return."' 2 7 The fear seems to be
that of victimization of taxpayers through unjustified prosecutions.
But what reason is there to believe the IRS would recommend prose-
cution of, or the Department of Justice actually would prosecute, a
taxpayer based on evidence of willful perpetuation of an error that is
any less compelling than the evidence-beyond a reasonable doubt-
of willful commission of the error, which is currently required to suc-
cessfully prosecute tax evasion? The same factors that now compel
the government to focus on the most aggravated cases of submission of
fraudulent returns should also constrain the government to prosecute
only the most flagrant cases of perpetuation of reporting errors if
amended returns become obligatory.i 28
Another commentator opposes criminalizing the failure to file an
obligatory amended return because of "a host of potential constitu-
tional problems arising from the vagueness of the triggering event...
'knowledge' of the prior error."129 Criminal prosecutions under cur-
rent law, however, must establish the taxpayer's "knowledge" of
wrongful items reported on the return, seemingly an equally vague
concept, but one not held to create constitutional infirmities.
Amended return obligations do not seem to present constitutional is-
sues distinct from those arising in the original return context.
In Cheek v. United States,'30 the Supreme Court squarely ad-
dressed the issue of the degree of "knowledge" that will support a
125. The civil fraud penalty would be applicable whenever the taxpayer's refusal to
amend constituted action (or inaction) undertaken with "the specific intent to
evade a tax known or believed to be owing." See supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
126. See 4 BrrrcR & LOKKEN, supra note 8, 114.9.2, at 114-90 ("[The evidence in
virtually any successful civil fraud case would support a [criminal] conviction
under § 7201, notwithstanding that guilt in a criminal case must be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt, rather than by the 'clear and convincing' standard that
suffices for the civil penalty.").
127. Bruton, supra note 1, § 53.10, at 53-45.
128. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
129. Harris, supra note 1, at 541 n.105 (parentheses omitted). Harris does not elabo-
rate further on this objection to the imposition of criminal penalties.
130. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
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criminal conviction. The Court vacated the conviction of an airline pi-
lot, finding fault with the judge's instruction to the jury that an "hon-
est but unreasonable belief' that wages were not income was not a
defense to the criminal charges.'13 The Court reiterated that convic-
tion of tax evasion under § 7201 or failure to file or failure to pay
under § 7203 requires proof that the violations were "willful" to safe-
guard against convictions stemming from taxpayers' insufficient
knowledge of complicated tax laws.' 3 2 Citing United States v. Mur-
dock,133 the Cheek Court reiterated that
Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunder-
standing as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to
the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by his
mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct. 1 3 4
The safeguards that Congress afforded taxpayers by criminalizing
only "willful" noncompliance with the tax laws should protect taxpay-
ers equally well against abusive prosecutions of violations of a newly
enacted duty to amend.13 5
Not all commentators have been hesitant to broaden taxpayers' ex-
posure to criminal sanctions. One student commentator favored
criminalizing reckless noncompliance with the Code,136 a lesser degree
of culpability than willful noncompliance. Under this standard, the
taxpayer's reckless failure to fie an obligatory amended return would
be criminalized. This commentator addressed concerns of overzealous
governmental prosecution by noting the high costs of governmental
prosecutions,137 the negative publicity engendered by losing a tax
prosecution case, 13 8 the ensuing loss of public support if the govern-
ment was perceived as "ganging up" on innocent taxpayers,13 9 and the
131. Id. at 207.
132. Id. at 200-02.
133. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
134. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991)(quoting United States v. Mur-
dock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933)).
135. As explained supra section 1I.C, the duty to amend known material errors might
be broadened to include a duty to investigate suspected material errors. This
duty would be breached if the taxpayer's failure to investigate departed from the
conduct expected of a reasonably prudent taxpayer, that is if the taxpayer's inac-
tion constituted negligence. The consequence of a breach of the duty to investi-
gate would be liability for a civil negligence penalty. Neither the civil fraud
penalty nor criminal penalties would apply to violations of a duty to investigate
in situations where the evidence is insufficient to establish that the taxpayer had
"knowledge" of material errors giving rise to the duty to amend.
136. Walter T. Henderson, Jr., Comment, Criminal Liability Under the Internal Reve-
nue Code: A Proposal to Make the "Voluntary" Compliance System a Little Less
"Voluntary," 140 U. PA. L. REy. 1429 (1992).
137. Id. at 1459.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1460.
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ultimate protection afforded by a jury of one's peers.140 These factors
would be equally likely to constrain overly zealous prosecutions of tax-
payers failing to comply with a duty to amend.
More conservative penalty schemes might impose lesser sanctions
on breaches of the duty to amend. The bottom line, however, is that
willful, flagrant breaches of the duty to amend do not deserve lesser
sanctions than equally willful, flagrant refusals to correctly report in-
come on the original return. So long as the government, as it does
now, focuses its resources on the most aggravated cases of willful non-
compliance, justice would be forthcoming.
2. No Double Penalty
No reason justifies doubly penalizing a taxpayer for committing a
penalizable error on the original return and for failing to comply with
a legal duty to correct the error. For example, a taxpayer who negli-
gently omits income from the original return and negligently fails to
comply with the duty to amend seemingly should be subject to a single
negligence penalty for failure to report this income. There is simply
an ongoing case of negligence.i 41 The "penalty" for failure to amend in
this situation would be the taxpayer's continuing exposure to the neg-
ligence penalty, an exposure that would disappear if the taxpayer cor-
rected the error on a qualified amended return. In like manner, a
taxpayer guilty of tax evasion by the falsification of the original return
would not be guilty of a second crime of tax evasion merely by failing
to file an obligatory amended return. A single crime of tax evasion
would exist, although the proof thereof could take into account the
reasons behind the taxpayer's failure to file the obligatory amended
return.
3. Reasonable Opportunity to Comply with a Duty to Amend
If an amended return is due, a due date must be specified. The
due date must give the taxpayer a reasonable opportunity to comply
with the duty to amend. For example, the amended return might be
required within sixty daysi 4 2 after the taxpayer acquired knowledge
that a material error had been committed or, if the law imposed a duty
to investigate, within sixty days after the taxpayer acquired sufficient
knowledge of the possibility of a material error that the taxpayer's
140. Id.
141. Similarly, the Corneel Proposal, supra note 38, would not have imposed a penalty
for failure to file an obligatory amended return in addition to a penalty for failure
to file the original return. See Harris, supra note 1, at 540.
142. Sixty days is the time allowed to the IRS to assess additional tax liability when
the taxpayer files an amended return within 60 days of the date on which the
period of limitations for the assessment of tax for the taxable year would other-
wise expire. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(7).
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failure to investigate further would constitute penalizable
negligence.143
The purpose of the sixty-day rule would not be to limit the tax-
payer's opportunity to avoid penalty by filing a qualified amended re-
turn. An amended return would be a qualified amended return,
absolving the taxpayer from the negligence penalty, if the amended
return was filed before the IRS had contacted the taxpayer,' 44 even if
filed after the sixty-day period and even if the error corrected was not
material. Instead, sixty days would mark the beginning of the period
when the taxpayer's failure to file might worsen the taxpayer's expo-
sure to penalty. For example, under a penalty parity structure, a neg-
ligent failure to amend within the sixty-day period would subject the
taxpayer to the negligence penalty even if the original error giving rise
to the duty to amend was not a penalizable error. Similarly, a fraudu-
lent failure to amend within the sixty-day period would subject the
taxpayer to the civil or criminal fraud penalty even if the commission
of the original error resulted only from negligence or from a nonnegli-
gent innocent mistake.
Suppose the taxpayer discovered a material error a short time, one
week for example, before the expiration of the limitations period for
the taxable year. The simplest rule to adopt might be that if the limi-
tations period expired before the taxpayer had been given a reason-
able opportunity to amend her return, then no duty to amend would
arise. Under this rule, if the statutory "reasonable opportunity" was
sixty days, then the taxpayer's discovery of a material error within
sixty days of the expiration of the limitations period would give rise to
no duty to amend. The taxpayer, of course, would retain the option of
amending her return nonetheless. By filing a qualified amended re-
turn, the taxpayer's exposure to penalty caused by the original return
error would be eliminated. Having no duty to amend, if the taxpayer
declined to amend her return, was then audited and assessed addi-
tional tax before expiration of the limitations period, the taxpayer
would be subject to penalty, but only to the extent the taxpayer's con-
duct with respect to the filing of the original return was penalizable
conduct. Since the taxpayer had no duty to amend, the taxpayer's
knowledge of the error and inaction could not increase the severity of
the original return error. For example, the taxpayer's inaction could
not convert a nonpenalizable original return error into a negligent or
fraudulent error.
143. While this formulation of the rule renders the due date of the amended return
somewhat uncertain, the uncertainty arises from the inherent uncertainty in the
concept of negligence. The factual issue is no more difficult than the issue of
whether a taxpayer's conduct with respect to an original return has been negli-
gent and should give rise to a penalty.
144. See supra subsection IV.C.1.
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An alternative approach would provide that the limitations period
would expire on the later of (1) its normal expiration date, or (2) sixty
days from the date of the taxpayer's acquisition of knowledge giving
rise to the taxpayer's duty to amend or duty to investigate further.
This approach, however, would create different limitations periods for
different taxpayers, a complication that might not be worth the benefit
of extending the duty to amend to errors discovered or suspected dur-
ing the sixty days preceding the normal limitations period expiration
date.
V. AMENDED RETURN OBLIGATION AND STATUTES
OF LIMITATIONS
Statutes of limitations exist to provide closure to prior tax years
and finality to the determination of tax obligations for those years.i45
Just as the concept of penalty parity is useful to examine how existing
penalties might be incorporated into a regime in which amended re-
turns are obligatory, so too the concept of limitations period parity is
useful to examine how existing statutes of limitations might be incor-
porated into a regime in which amended returns are obligatory.
A. Current Statutes of Limitations
A somewhat general observation is that the more egregious the
taxpayer's reporting errors, the longer the time allowed for the IRS to
commence an audit of the taxpayer's return. If the taxpayer's original
return is nonfraudulent, then the limitations period for the assess-
ment of tax begins on the later of (1) the due date of the original re-
turn, or (2) the date the original return is filed.146 The limitations
period for the assessment of tax is normally three years. 14 7 If, how-
ever, the taxpayer's nonfraudulent original return omits gross income
in excess of twenty-five percent of the gross income stated in the re-
turn, then the IRS has six years, instead of three years, in which to
make an assessment of tax.148 A fraudulent original return does not
145. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)(stating that stat-
utes of limitations "promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival
of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memo-
ries have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one
has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within
the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes
to prevail over the right to prosecute them.' (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944))).
146. I.R.C. § 6501(a), (b)(1).
147. Id. § 6501(a).
148. Id. § 6501(e)(1)(A). Similarly, omissions from the gross estate of amounts in ex-
cess of 25% of the gross estate stated in the estate tax return extends the limita-
tions period for estate tax assessment from 3 years to 6 years. Id. § 6501(e)(2).
Similar rules govern the omission of gifts from gift tax returns (I.R.C.
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trigger a limitations period 149 so that tax, interest, and penalties may
be assessed at any time.150 If the taxpayer does not file a return, the
limitations period does not begin to run.15 1
An amended return showing additional tax due generally has no
effect on the limitations period.152 For example, a limitations period
of six years is not shortened to three years by the filing of an amended
return reporting the omitted gross income.' 5 3 Similarly, a nonfraudu-
lent return correcting a fraudulent original return does not curtail the
IRS's unlimited period for the assessment of tax.154 If, however, an
amended return is filed within sixty days of the date on which the
limitations period would otherwise expire, the IRS must assess the
additional tax shown on the return within sixty days after receipt of
the amended return.15 5 The taxpayer and the IRS may agree to ex-
tend the limitations period by any amount of time if such agreement is
entered into before the limitations period otherwise expires.156
If the taxpayer's original return constitutes a tax crime, the IRS
generally has three years from the date of commission of the crime to
indict the taxpayer,15 7 but the limitations period is six years for the
more important tax violations.158 A corrected amended return does
§ 6501(e)(2)) and omissions of excise taxes from excise tax returns (I.R.C.
§ 6501(e)(3)). Although the textual discussion of limitations period parity focuses
on federal income tax returns, the concept of limitations period parity is equally
applicable to the federal wealth transfer taxes and the federal excise taxes.
149. Id. § 6501(c)(1).
150. If any part of the underpayment of tax is attributable to fraud, then the assess-
ment period is unlimited with respect to all items pertaining to the taxable year,
including any erroneous items on the return not attributable to fraud. United
States v. Diebl, 460 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D. Tex. 1978), affd, 586 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.
1978).
151. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3).
152. Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 393-94 n.8 (1984); Zellerbach Paper
Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172 (1934). If the original return is nonfraudulent, but
the amended return is fraudulent, Badaracco seems to imply that the 3-year (or
6-year) statute of limitations applicable to the nonfraudulent original return con-
tinues to apply. Professor Kahn doubts that most courts would reach this result,
however, if the matter was litigated. Kahn, supra note 83, at 471.
153. E.g., Houston v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 486, 489 (1962).
154. Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386 (1984). The Supreme Court's reason-
ing and conclusion are criticized by Kahn, supra note 83.
155. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(7).
156. Id. § 6501(c)(4).
157. Id. § 6531.
158. Section 6531 of the Code specifies a limitations period of 6 years under the princi-
pal statutes used to prosecute criminal tax reporting violations: § 6531(2) cover-
ing § 7201 tax evasion; § 6531(4) covering § 7203 failure to file or failure to pay;
§ 6531(5) covering § 7206(1) filing a false return or false statement; and § 6531(3)
covering § 7206(2) aiding, assisting, or counseling falsity or fraud.
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not negate the commission of the crime, although it might dissuade
the IRS from instituting criminal proceedings.i5 9
B. Limitations Periods: A Normative Approach
Statutes of limitations that accompany a legal duty to amend
might be designed to affect a parity structure. A limitations period
parity structure will exist to the extent the submission of an amended
return gives the IRS the same amount of time to investigate the re-
turn, as amended, that the IRS would have had if the amended items
had been submitted on an original return. 60 For example, a non-
fraudulent return ordinarily gives the IRS three years from the later
of (1) the date the return is filed, or (2) the due date of the return to
assess tax.' 6 ' A fraudulent return does not create a limitations period
for the assessment of tax.162 Therefore, under a parity structure, a
fraudulent return followed after the original return due date by a non-
fraudulent amended return (curing the original return fraud) would
commence a three-year statute of limitations beginning with the date
the amended return was filed.' 63 A nonfraudulent original return
fraudulently amended, under a parity structure, would suspend the
running of the statute of limitations. Similarly, a fraudulent failure to
amend an erroneous but nonfraudulent original return (subjecting the
taxpayer to a fraud penalty under a penalty parity structure) would
suspend the running of the limitations period.
Limitations period parity would provide identical audit exposure
for taxpayers committing or perpetuating identical types of reporting
errors, thereby providing for consistent, equitable treatment of simi-
larly situated taxpayers. Therefore, limitations period parity has a
natural appeal, although there are overriding reasons not to adopt a
parity structure in some situations.
C. Limitations Period Recommendations
The existing statutes of limitations obviously do not achieve parity.
For example, a taxpayer who faces a limitations period of infinite du-
ration because she filed a fraudulent original return has no opportu-
159. See supra subsections IV.C.2.d and IV.C.3.
160. Parity, however, will not allow the IRS more time to audit a taxpayer who cor-
rects an error than a similarly situated taxpayer who does not correct an error,
which clearly would be inequitable.
161. I.R.C. § 6501(a), (b)(1).
162. Id. § 6501(c)(1).
163. It seems irrelevant whether or not the taxpayers amended return is filed volun-
tarily (i.e., is a "qualified amended return"). The purpose of statutes of limita-
tions is to terminate stale disputes. Once a nonfraudulent amended return is
filed, the reason for an indefinite limitations period disappears. See Kahn, supra
note 83, at 476-77. Thus, limitations period parity, unlike penalty parity, is not
defined in terms of whether or not the amended return is voluntarily filed.
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nity to shorten the period to three years by means of a nonfraudulent
amended return.' 64 A taxpayer has no opportunity to shorten the lim-
itations period to three years by filing a timely amended return if the
taxpayer files an erroneous but nonfraudulent original return that
omits from gross income an amount in excess of twenty-five percent of
the gross income stated in the return. Instead, the taxpayer remains
bound by the six-year statute of limitations triggered by the original
return.i 65 In these and other cases, would a parity structure be a bet-
ter accompaniment to an obligatory amended return regime? This
question is first considered in the context of nonfraudulent original
returns and then in the context of fraudulent original returns.
1. Nonfraudulent Original Returns
Suppose a taxpayer filed a nonfraudulent return, triggering a
three-year limitations period and then subsequently filed a non-
fraudulent amended return that improperly restated a smaller
amount of gross income. Assume further that the gross income that
should have been reported on the return now exceeded twenty-five
percent of the gross income stated on the return, as amended. Should
an extension of the limitations period to six years be triggered? For
either of two reasons, the answer appears to be "no."
First, this extension apparently would not be needed to achieve
parity. The six-year limitations period applies under current law only
to the extent the omitted gross income is not "disclosed in the return,
or in a statement attached to the return, in a manner adequate to
apprise the Secretary of the nature and amount of such item."' 66 The
hypothetical taxpayer's inclusion in the original return of gross in-
come omitted from the amended return seems to have adequately ap-
prised the IRS of the nature and amount of the item.1 67 Therefore, if
the information shown on the original and amended returns had all
been set forth on an original return, only a three-year limitations pe-
riod, not a six-year limitations period, would have been triggered.
Second, if taxpayers knew that an amended return might lengthen the
limitations period, they might be discouraged from filing amended re-
turns.' 68 The amended return in this situation would not be obliga-
164. See supra section V.A.
165. See supra section V.A.
166. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii).
167. See Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28, 36 (1958)(finding that the ex-
tended limitations period provided by § 275(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, the precursor of § 6501(e)(1), reflected the "special disadvantage" the IRS
faced in detecting omitted income for which the return on its face provided "no
clue").
168. Kahn, supra note 83, at 480. See also Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
172, 180 (1934)("Supplement and correction... will not take from a taxpayer,
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tory; rather, it would show a reduction of taxable income. It may be
poor policy to discourage the filing of "honest"169 amended returns.
By contrast, no real policy consideration opposes limiting a six-
year limitations period created by the original return to the lesser of
(1) three years, or (2) the remainder of the six-year period, by the filing
of a curative amended return.170 The shorter limitations period would
achieve the equitable advantage of placing the amending taxpayer in
parity1 71 with taxpayers whose original returns reflected the tax-
payer's positions, as amended, and would encourage compliance with
the duty to amend by offering a reduced limitations period.172
Suppose the taxpayer amended a nonfraudulent original return by
filing a fraudulent amended return. Assuming that the fraudulent
amended return requested a refund that was paid, the IRS would have
five years after making the refund within which to seek its recov-
ery.173 Would the better policy be that the fraudulent amended re-
turn should suspend the running of the limitations period, placing the
amending taxpayer in parity with taxpayers whose original returns
were fraudulent?
The justifications for an unlimited assessment period for fraudu-
lent returns are that (1) a fraudulent return does not provide the ac-
counting to the government necessary for a proper assessment of
tax,174 and (2) the proof of fraud is arduous and time-consuming, re-
quiring the government to unearth evidence not only of incorrectly re-
ported items, but also proof that the taxpayer acted with fraudulent
intent in misreporting these items.17 5 In the situation hypothesized,
the government's case is somewhat advanced by the nonfraudulent
original return, pinpointing the items in dispute and establishing the
taxpayer's original conviction that a different tax treatment was ap-
free from personal fault, the protection of a term of limitation already running for
his benefit.").
169. "An honest return is one in which deficiencies, if any, are attributable to bona fide
differences of judgment or to innocent errors caused by oversight or negligence."
Kahn, supra note 83, at 461 n.1 (emphasis added).
170. Professor Kahn argues that as a matter of interpretation of enacted law, courts
may have erred by "mechanically" applying the rule that amended returns don't
lengthen the limitations period to prevent amended returns from shortening the
limitations period "without questioning whether different considerations were
present." Kahn, supra note 83, at 480.
171. See supra note 158.
172. In this situation, the amended return would show increased tax due and would be
an obligatory amended return if the amount originally underpaid was "material."
173. I.R.C. § 6532(b).
174. See Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172, 180 (1934)(recognizing as a
"return" a document that purports to be and sworn to as a return and which
"evinces an honest and genuine endeavor to satisfy the law").
175. See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1984)(noting the difficulty
of proving fraud cases and the possibility that the taxpayer's underlying records
might have been falsified or destroyed).
19971
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
propriate than that later claimed. Nonetheless, there seems little rea-
son to encourage a fraudulent amended return by protecting it with a
finite limitations period. A suspension of the statute of limitations
when the fraudulent amended return is filed-achieving parity-
seems appropriate. 176
A more common situation might feature a taxpayer who first filed a
nonfraudulent original return, triggering a three-year limitations pe-
riod, but then who fraudulently failed to amend. Suppose, for exam-
ple, following enactment of an obligatory amended return
requirement, the taxpayer's accountant informed the taxpayer that
the previous year's return (nonfraudulently but erroneously prepared
by the accountant) omitted twenty percent of the taxpayer's gross in-
come for that year and that an amended return was required by law.
The taxpayer refused to file the amended return and thereby con-
verted the nonfraudulent error into a fraudulent error. The likelihood
that the amended return would be filed might be greater if the ac-
countant was able to inform the taxpayer that her failure to file the
amended return would suspend the running of the three-year limita-
tions period and would enable the IRS to assess tax, interest, and pen-
alties at any time.17 7 Thus, equity and enhanced tax compliance both
appear to be served in this situation by adoption of a limitations pe-
riod parity rule-a suspension of the limitations period.
2. Fraudulent Original Returns
A parity structure would provide a taxpayer who filed a nonfraudu-
lent amended return following a fraudulent original return with the
same limitations period protections enjoyed by a taxpayer whose origi-
nal return was nonfraudulent. Thus, the amended return would com-
mence the running of a three-year limitations period (six years if the
176. As a practical matter, fraudulent amendments of nonfraudulent returns may not
occur with enough frequency to make the limitations period issue of much impor-
tance. This is so because the taxpayer may well hesitate to attempt to deceive the
government about items that were previously disclosed nonfraudulently.
177. Professor Harris is reluctant to allow an unlimited limitations period when a
nonfraudulent original return is followed by a fraudulent failure to amend, "sub-
jecting taxpayers in borderline cases to the potential of litigation in the distant
future." Harris suggests extending the limitations period for an additional 3
years as a compromise solution. Harris, supra note 1, at 542-43. But the risk of
litigation in the distant future of borderline cases is no greater than the risk that
exists under current law: original return borderline cases will be litigated in the
distant future. The argument ignores the reality that the IRS, possessing the
burden of proof in fraud cases by clear and convincing evidence, is constrained by
limited resources to pursue the more egregious cases. This situation is unlikely
to change if amended returns become obligatory. The more distant the future,
the less likely the available evidence will be clear and convincing and the less
likely that the IRS will be willing to consume substantial resources to pursue
what would be relatively stale cases.
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amended return, although nonfraudulent, omitted income in excess of
twenty-five percent of the gross income stated in the return, as
amended). The limitations period would begin running on the date
the nonfraudulent amended return was Med.
Assuming, as argued above, 78 that the amended return should fail
to negate the taxpayer's exposure to civil fraud or criminal penalties
stemming from the fraudulent original return, a three-year statute of
limitations probably would be too short. Under current law, the un-
limited period of limitations for civil penalty purposes,179 combined
with the six-year limitations period for criminal purposes,' 80 effec-
tively gives the government six years to complete an investigation of
possible fraud. During the six years, the government retains the op-
tion to seek civil fraud penalties, criminal penalties, or both. Because
cases of suspected fraud require more time to develop, the time
granted to the IRS to develop its case probably should not be reduced
to fewer than six years if no criminal indictment is issued within the
six-year period, or a stated period of time (perhaps one year) following
conclusion of criminal proceedings if a criminal indictment is is-
sued.' 8 1 If this approach is followed, a nonfraudulent amended return
that cured the original return fraud would have no effect on criminal
statutes of limitations, but would commence the running of a limita-
tions period on civil assessments that would expire at the later of (1)
three years after the submission of the nonfraudulent amended re-
turn, 8 2 or (2) six years from the date of filing of the fraudulent origi-
nal return, or (3) in the event a criminal indictment is issued within
six years of filing the original return, one year following conclusion of
the criminal proceedings.183
178. See supra subsection IV.C.2.
179. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1).
180. See supra section VA&
181. An IRS auditing agent is instructed to both suspend the examination once she
has "firm" indications of fraud and refer the case to the Criminal Investigation
Division (CID) of the IRS. SALrm , supra note 96, % 8.06[7], at 8-63. A joint
investigation by the agent and the CID may ensue. Under I.R.C. § 7602(c), the
IRS is barred from issuing a civil summons once a case is referred to the Depart-
ment of Justice for criminal prosecution. Further, a criminal conviction (or guilty
plea) collaterally estaps the taxpayer from denying civil fraud. 4 Brr'rER & LOK-
KEN, supra note 8, 114.6, at 114-58. These considerations frequently motivate
the IRS to await the outcome of criminal proceedings before pressing civil fraud
penalties.
182. This period would be 6 years in the unlikely event that the amended return,
although nonfraudulent, omitted income in excess of 25% of the gross income
stated in the return, as amended.
183. By contrast, Harris would impose a 3-year statute of limitations commencing
with the filing of a nonfraudulent amended return if the amended return immu-
nized the taxpayer from criminal prosecution under a "formal" voluntary disclo-
sure program. Harris, supra note 1, at 541-42.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The statutory adoption of a legal obligation to correct material tax
return errors discovered within the period of limitations has a logical
appeal. It is administratively unsound to impose no obligations upon
a taxpayer who discovers that her tax return materially understates
her tax liability. Some might fear unwarranted governmental asser-
tions that taxpayers have inaccurately reported their tax liabilities.
Some may also fear extending the period of limitations to keep the
government accurately informed of the taxpayers' tax liabilities.
These fears, in the reality of practice, would likely be unfounded. Fur-
ther, to the extent the legal obligation increased voluntary tax compli-
ance, it would reduce the need for intrusive governmental audits.
If a legal obligation was enacted, the taxpayer would face a contin-
uing duty to self-report, which would extend from the due date of the
original return until the expiration of the period of limitations for the
taxable year. It would be appropriate, although not necessary, to ex-
tend the duty to correct material tax return errors to a duty to investi-
gate the possibility of material tax return errors whenever a
reasonably prudent taxpayer would undertake such an investigation.
The threshold at which an error (or collection of errors) would become
material would need to be set at a sufficiently high level to justify the
taxpayer's time, trouble, and expense to make the corrections. The
judgment of an appropriate threshold is implicitly contained in the
§ 6662(b)(2) "accuracy-related" penalty. This threshold could be incor-
porated as the measure of materiality of an error resulting in an
underpayment of tax. If the reporting error did not cause an un-
derpayment of tax, then it might be deemed material only if it was an
incorrect response to an informational question specifically included
on the tax return form.
A penalty parity structure is generally the most appropriate ac-
companiment to a legal duty to correct material tax return errors be-
cause it provides the most consistent treatment of errors that are
committed, perpetuated, or neutralized by the taxpayer's tax return
and amendments made thereto. A penalty parity structure uses no-
tice to the taxpayer of an IRS examination of the taxpayer's return as
the appropriate point in time to evaluate the culpability of the tax-
payer's conduct. Under a penalty parity structure, the culpable per-
petuation of an error would subject the taxpayer to the same penalty
that would have applied if the same level of culpability had led to com-
mission of the error. On the other hand, the taxpayer's correction of
an error before notice of an audit would alleviate the taxpayer's expo-
sure to penalty just as if the error had never been committed. The one
situation in which penalty parity treatment seems inappropriate is
when the taxpayer's original return is fraudulent. In this case, an au-
tomatic waiver of civil or criminal fraud penalties as the result of the
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taxpayer's timely-filed amended return would offer too much opportu-
nity for abuse. Instead, as under current law, the assertion of civil or
criminal fraud penalties based on the fraudulent preparation of the
original return would remain within the government's discretion.
A limitations period parity structure is generally appropriate
under an obligatory amended return regime. Under the federal in-
come tax, for example, a limitations period parity structure can be de-
vised to incorporate existing limitations period differences between (1)
nonfraudulent returns that do not omit income in excess of twenty-five
percent of the gross income stated in the return, (2) nonfraudulent
returns that omit income in excess of twenty-five percent of the gross
income stated in the return, and (3) fraudulent returns. Under a par-
ity structure, the amount of gross income omitted from the return, as
amended, and the fraudulent or nonfraudulent status of the return, as
amended, would determine the applicable limitations period.
In implementing this approach, if the taxpayer's original return
was nonfraudulent, either a fraudulent amendment of the return or a
fraudulent failure to comply with a duty to amend would suspend the
running of the limitations period. If the original limitations period
was six years because the taxpayer omitted income in excess of
twenty-five percent of the gross income stated in the return, then a
nonfraudulent amended return that reduced the unreported gross in-
come below the twenty-five percent threshold would limit the limita-
tions period to the shorter of (1) three years, or (2) the unexpired
portion of the six-year limitations period.
If the taxpayer's original return was fraudulent, then a nonfraudu-
lent amended return would relieve the taxpayer from unlimited expo-
sure to audit and assessment of tax. The limitations period, however,
would have to be long enough to allow the government to establish a
factual foundation for the imposition of civil or criminal fraud penal-
ties (or both) based on the fraudulent original return, should the gov-
ernment wish to do so. This would justify a limitations period that
would end at the later of (1) three years after the submission of the
nonfraudulent amended return, (2) six years from the date of filing of
the fraudulent original return, or (3) in the event a criminal indict-
ment was issued within six years of filing the original return, one year
following the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.
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